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ABSTRACT 
We examine whether corporate governance affects the level of information 
asymmetry in the capital market. We hypothesize that firms with stronger corporate gov-
ernance would be more likely to voluntarily disclose corporate information using public 
rather than selective methods, and that this would be associated with lower levels of in-
formation asymmetry. We carefully establish the path through which corporate govern-
ance affects a firm’s voluntary disclosure method based on previous literature. Surpris-
ingly, in full sample analysis we find that firms with stronger corporate governance (as 
measured by Gompers et al.’s, 2003, G index) are associated with higher levels of infor-
mation asymmetry (as measured by Easley et al.’s, 1996, PIN). In subsample analysis, we 
find that, consistent with our hypothesis, for the most weakly governed firms, stronger 
corporate governance is associated with lower information asymmetry, and the impact of 
corporate governance on information asymmetry is more pronounced than that of firms 
with moderate and strong corporate governance.  
To further test our hypothesis, we consider the external effect of Regulation Fair 
Disclosure on the disclosure method to examine the corporate governance-information 
asymmetry relationship. Consistent with our hypothesis, our evidence suggests that by 
forbidding the practice of selective disclosure, the regulation significantly decreases the 
impact of corporate governance on information asymmetry level. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
One aspect of finance involves efficient borrowing and lending of funds. In the 
setting of a corporation, conflicts of interest arise between borrowers and lenders as a 
consequence of the separation of ownership and control. Broadly speaking, there are two 
main classes of such conflicts studied by finance researchers, namely the lemon problem 
of adverse selection and the agency problem of moral hazard. The former deals with the 
possibility that managers overstate the firm’s value and mislead savers or lenders into 
making inappropriate investment decisions; and the latter deals with the possibility that 
managers improperly use or expropriate shareholder wealth. One practical solution to 
these problems is monitoring (and signalling) through financial disclosure. In this thesis, 
we focus on the effect of financial disclosure on the adverse selection problem. 
Financial disclosure is a channel through which existing and potential sharehold-
ers obtain valuation information about the firm. It is the connection between corporate 
insiders and capital market investors. When there is new information, it could remain un-
disclosed, it could be mandatorily disclosed, or it could be voluntarily disclosed. There-
fore, the content of disclosure reveals not only a firm’s financial and operational situation, 
but also its managers’ incentives and discretion to disclose relevant information. It re-
flects the power managers can exert on disclosure decision making, and this distribution 
of power between managers and shareholders is integrally linked to the firm’s corporate 
governance.1 And as information is distributed through different channels to different 
receivers, information asymmetry arises among market participants. In conclusion, the 
effect of disclosure as a connection between managers and shareholders involves the as-
sociation of management power and shareholder variation. It characterizes the link be-
tween corporate governance and information asymmetry through the compound relation-
ships between corporate governance and disclosure, and disclosure and information 
asymmetry. 
                                                 
1 This research uses Gompers et al. (2003)’s G index to proxy firms quality of corporate governance, 
which they construct using 24 governance provisions. G is equal to the number of a firm’s provisions. It 
measures the balance of power between shareholders and managers. More provisions mean a higher G and 
weaker corporate governance. See Chapter III for a detailed description on how G is constructed. Earlier 
studies include Bebchuk et al. (2009), Gompers et al. (2003) and Masulis et al. (2007).  
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Both parts of the corporate governance-information asymmetry relationship have 
been studied in previous literature. Various studies on the relationship between corporate 
governance and disclosure have been done on various markets around the world.2 Since 
the content of mandatory disclosure is not (legally) subject to the will of managers, re-
searchers generally focus attention on the association between corporate governance and 
voluntary disclosure. They consider the quality and value of voluntary disclosure as well 
as ownership structure and composition of the board of directors. However, in these 
studies, the method of disclosure (either selective or public) is not considered. 
Holland (1998) is among the first to study the distinction between selective vol-
untary disclosure and public voluntary disclosure. When news is voluntarily disclosed, it 
can either be delivered through private channels, or it can be released publicly. Selective 
disclosure could lead to information asymmetry among news receivers. Holland (1998) 
provides descriptive incentives for the structural difference in mangers’ voluntary disclo-
sure choices, but does not specify any internal cause of the structural difference. On the 
other hand, Core (2001) separates the voluntary disclosure process into two steps. First, 
firms decide their optimal disclosure policy based on developing needs, usually decided 
by cross-sectional differences; then when information arrives, corporate governance de-
termines the ability the firm to carry out its optimal disclosure policy. 
We link Core’s (2001) idea with Holland’s (1998) voluntary disclosure separation 
theory, and outline a path between corporate governance and disclosure method. The ab-
solute amount of voluntary disclosure is determined by cross-sectional differences. 
Meanwhile, the relative amount, or the method of voluntary disclosure, is determined by 
corporate governance. Strong governance ensures that the firm’s optimal policy is fol-
lowed using public disclosure as necessary; while weaker governance gives managers a 
greater ability to selectively release information for personal interest. As a consequence, 
the variation of the disclosure method across firms may bring about different levels of 
information asymmetry in the capital market. The above survey, together with a detailed 
analysis in Chapters II and III, develop the main argument in our thesis: The level of 
corporate governance determines a firm’s information structure, and thus influences its 
                                                 
2 See for example El-Gazzar (1998), Eng and Mak (2003), Lang and Lundholm (1993), Ruland et al. 
(1990), Schadewitz and Blevins (1998), and Williamson (1981). 
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level of information asymmetry. 
Using a sample of 5,285 observations during the period between 1995 and 2005, 
we find a negative and statistically significant relationship between corporate governance 
and information asymmetry (in the sense that well governed firms have higher informa-
tion asymmetry). This finding is supplemented by a subsample analysis on different gov-
ernance levels. We find that the impact of corporate governance is more severe for 
weakly governed firms, and is less severe for strongly governed firms. Specifically, the 
weakly governed firms behave significantly differently from the other firms. The G coef-
ficient signs are positive for weakly firms and negative for the others. Therefore, we sug-
gest that while managers of weakly governed firms may selectively disclose information 
to exploit rent seeking opportunities, those of moderately governed firms may rather use 
selective disclosure to avoid job loss. 
In further analysis, we examine how the disclosure method is related to the rela-
tionship between corporate governance and information asymmetry. The SEC enforced 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD) as an external force regulating the disclosure 
method. We find that Regulation FD changes the pattern of how corporate governance 
influences the level of information asymmetry. Generally, the degree of impact for cor-
porate governance on information asymmetry is reduced. In particular, the decrease is 
more pronounced for weakly governed firms, suggesting that changes in corporate gov-
ernance provide a strong internal force on the method of disclosure for firms with suffi-
ciently weak governance. The above evidence is robust to controlling for several other 
key factors on information asymmetry including analyst following, capitalization, trading 
volume, block holder ownership, and book-to-market ratio. 
Our study makes several valuable contributions to the literature. First, we outline 
a clear channel where disclosure method is the intermediary through which corporate 
governance affects market behaviour, and we clearly describe the path through which 
corporate governance affects a firm’s voluntary disclosure method. We provide evidence 
suggesting that corporate governance affects market information asymmetry. Second, we 
examine the impact of Regulation FD in a new and unique way. We test the relationship 
between corporate governance and information asymmetry, and then examine the effect 
that Regulation FD had on this relationship to infer how the regulation affects the disclo-
4 
sure method. We find that Regulation FD successfully changes the disclosure method of 
adopted firms, and equalizes the impact of corporate governance on information asym-
metry for firms with different governance levels. 3 We also provide a rich review of 
academic studies on Regulation FD by summarizing the existing literature into four dis-
tinct approaches. In addition, our research substantially expands the growing literature on 
the corporate governance index constructed by governance provisions related to Gompers 
et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009). We find that while the E Index developed by 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) may contain most of the firm value information driven by G, it 
does not seem to contain as much information about corporate disclosure and information 
asymmetry level as the G index.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II provides a detailed lit-
erature review on Regulation FD, corporate governance and voluntary disclosure, and 
voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry. Chapter III describes the data and sam-
ple construction. Chapter IV presents our hypothesis and methodology. Chapter V pre-
sents the empirical results and robustness tests on the impact of corporate governance on 
information asymmetry level. Chapter VI concludes the thesis. 
  
                                                 
3 Our study can also be viewed as an empirical test on the effectiveness of the legal institution in the capital market. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Regulation Fair Disclosure 
2.1.1 An Overview of Regulation Fair Disclosure 
On August 15, 2000, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission passed Rules 
10b5-1 and 10b5-2: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading Regulation, which was 
proposed on December 20, 1999 and would go into effect on October 23, 2000. The 
regulation is commonly referred to as Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD). It re-
quires publicly traded companies to disclose relevant information to all investors simul-
taneously. Under the regulation, any material information disclosed in private must be 
publicly released within 24 hours or the next business day by filling an SEC 8-K form 
through the SEC’s EDGAR system,4 issuing a press release, or making a broadcasting or 
internet announcement. Although for violations, responsible individuals are subjected to 
fines up to one million dollars for issuers and fifty thousand dollars for executives, the 
regulation covers only officers, directions, investor relations officers, public relations of-
ficers, and other authorized spokespeople, and it applies only to the communications be-
tween the above authorized spokespeople and the investment community. 
2.1.1.1 The history of U.S. insider trading regulation 
The U.S. government addresses concerns about preventing insider trading fraud 
through two main manners: the common law and the SEC rules. 
The first attempt in trading regulation happened in 1909 when the Supreme Court 
made its decision that firms must disclose inside information or they should abstain from 
using it to trade. However, the question “who is an insider?” was not answered at that 
time. Later, a more comprehensive version was proposed after the NYSE collapse during 
the late 1920’s to the early 1930’s. In 1933, section 17 of the Securities Act received 
sanction to forbid frauds in security sale, and this action was later reinforced in the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934, which defined and prohibited certain forms of trading frauds. 
                                                 
4 In 2004 the SEC proposed Rule (33-8496) which encourage firms to voluntarily file disclosure reports in 
the extensible business reporting language (XBRL). See Debreceny et al. (2005) for a descriptive valuation 
of this rule. 
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The SEC’s Rule 10b-5 in 1942 was based on the 1934 Act, and it concerned both in-
formed buying and informed selling. Although the term “insider trading” was not clearly 
defined in all three rules, “insider” was referred to as corporate officers, directors and 
owners of at least 10% of a firm’s stock in the 1934 Act. The 1942 rule broadened this 
definition by including corporate “outsiders” and people who receive illicit tips into the 
list. 
The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 was the first to prohibit traders from 
trading on material information, and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforce-
ment Act of 1988 recoded the 1984 Act, adding information “tippers” to the covering list. 
Both acts entitled the SEC the right to charge up to three times the amount of any illegal 
gain from insider trading. However, the definition of “material information” was not 
clearly explained. As a substitute, the existing definitions from the case law in practice 
were applied. Mainly based on the Basic v. Leviuson and TSC Industries v. Northway 
cases, the case law considers that information is material “if there is a substantial likeli-
hood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in making an investment 
decision” (Bethel, 2007, pg 337). 
Even in the latest Regulation FD this important term is still not defined. However, 
FD is the first to clearly provide specific types of “material” information such as “earn-
ings information, mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, joint ventures, or changes in assets, 
new products or discoveries, changes in control or management, changes in an auditor, 
or defaults on senior securities, bankruptcies or receiverships” (Bethel, 2007, pg 337). 
And instead of setting an “affirmative burden” to disclose information, the regulation re-
quires wide distribution of information once the officer delivers a message. 
Later in 2004 the SEC issued additional guidance on filing form 8-K disclosure to 
better support Regulation FD. Such issues, together with FD and other previous rules, 
help the SEC to better adapt to emerging changes in the capital market arising from on-
going technological innovation. 
2.1.1.2 Why did the SEC put Regulation FD into action? 
The SEC believed that the practice of selective disclosure leads to (1) a loss of 
investors’ confidence in the integrity and fairness of the capital market; (2) the same 
negative impact as insider trading, which was illegal even though selective disclosure 
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was not; (3) a commoditization of material information under which stock issuers might 
tip analysts who give favoured reports and exclude analysts who refused to do so. (Ham-
ilton and Trautmann, 2000) 
Some of the SEC’s rationales were supported by academic theory from previous 
research. For example, Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) show that as informed traders 
operate aggressively, their common private information is incorporated into stock prices 
very rapidly. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) show that having a large amount of public 
information serves to reduce information asymmetry and the associated risk to market 
makers. Foster and Viswanathan (1996) show that the differences between initial infor-
mation sources for informed traders determine their specific "monopoly power" over 
other traders and market makers. Therefore, if selective disclosure is prohibited and every 
investor receives identical information, none of them will have a superior position in the 
market. In that case, asymmetry disappears, information is reflected by price very quickly, 
and there is no abnormal profit available for informed traders.  
Empirical evidence also supports the SEC's proposal on regulating selective dis-
closure. Frankel et al. (1999) and Bowen et al. (2002) show that conference calls are in-
formative but not all investors have equal access to this information. It creates a selective 
disclosure problem, and leads to an information gap between the analysts’ community 
and ordinary investors. 
2.1.1.3  Debates among affected parties before the sanction 
After Regulation FD was proposed, the SEC received over 6,000 letters support-
ing the rule, mainly from individual investors. Many of them expressed their frustration 
when they sometimes saw prices moving sharply, but they did not receive any related 
news until quite a long time later. Other supporters believed that, besides enhancing capi-
tal market confidence, the new regulation would encourage the flow of information to 
investors and would reduce financial analysts' existing reliance on firm-provided infor-
mation. 
Opponents of the regulation were mainly from the analysts’ community as well as 
some stock issuers who frequently used conference calls as information disclosure media. 
They argued that as some key words in the regulation, such as “material information” and 
“non-exclusive disclosure”, did not provide explicit definitions and measures for com-
8 
pliance, the regulation might bring about a “chilling effect,” under which firms would 
provide less and substandard information to prevent being caught violating the regulation. 
They also argued that individual investors could get lost without professional interpreta-
tion from analysts when firms released data simultaneously to all parties. 
2.1.2  Academic Studies on Regulation FD 
One of the points against the new regulation was the fear that if firms did not 
know how to comply because of the imprecise, ambiguous wording, then they would 
provide as little information as possible to avoid being punished by the SEC. As shown in 
a survey conducted by the National Investor Relation Institute (NIRI) in 2000, 42% of 
462 investor relation professionals said they would limit their communication practice. 
However, according to a later survey by NIRI in 2001 after Regulation FD went into ef-
fect, only 24% of the 577 professionals said they did reduce information disclosure, 
compared to 48% who said there were no change on their conducts and 27% who admit-
ted that they were giving even more information.5 Another NIRI survey showed that 90% 
of firms now allowed full access for all investors to conference calls, compared to 60% 
before Regulation FD.6 It seems at a glance that by the implementation of Regulation FD, 
the SEC substantially achieved its goal. 
However, there are also plenty of surveys telling different stories. According to 
the Wall Street Journal on October 17, 2005, although information flows are not curtailed 
by the regulation, the planned result to stop the practice of selective disclosure is also in-
adequate. For instance, 97% firms continue the one-to-one meetings with analysts and 
institutional investors, and 71% of them still provide earning guidance in the breakout 
sessions after brokerage house presentations. What was worse, a CFA institute survey in 
2003 showed that only 45% members voted that information from stock issuers was of 
good quality, compared to 60% in 1999.7 
Sparked by the debatable anecdotal evidence listed above, considerable academic 
                                                 
5 See Mathew et al. (2004)  
6 See Duarte et al. (2008). 
7 See M. Rapport, Corporate governance (a special report); Five years later: critics felt regulation FD 
would choke off the flow of corporate information. Here's why it didn't happen, Wall St J, East Ed (2005), p. 
R 8 New York, N.Y. Oct. 17. 
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research has involved Regulation FD. These studies can be grouped into four distinct ap-
proaches as follows: (1) to investigate market behaviour; (2) to study analysts’ behaviour; 
(3) to see how information asymmetry changes, and (4) to learn how firms react to the 
regulation, that is, how corporate performance changes after the regulation. 
2.1.2.1 The market behaviour approach 
Research on Regulation FD begins with studies on how the general market be-
haviour changes and the meaning of these changes. Early evidence from Zitzewitz (2002) 
shows that multi-forecasting days account for over 70% of new information in the first 
quarter after Regulation FD, compared to 35% before the regulation. Zitzewitz concludes 
that the regulation reduces selective disclosure to analysts without reducing total infor-
mation. Most studies about the market behaviour approach employ the return volatility as 
a proxy for stock informative level. For example, Heflin et al. (2003) observe that stock 
price deviation, a measure of market information that is referred to as “information gap,” 
becomes smaller after the regulation. This observation is further supported by Francis et 
al. (2006) who apply both event volatility and general return volatility as information 
proxies. Bailey et al. (2003) observe an increase in trading volume, but a decline in return 
volatility around earning releases after Regulation FD. They claim that the decline is due 
to decimalization which happened almost at the same time as Regulation FD. Similarly, 
Eleswarapu et al. (2004) observe a decline in return volatility around mandatory earnings 
announcements. They conclude that information flow is unchanged because the decline 
loses its statistical significance when voluntary announcements are taken into account.  
In contrast, Mathew et al. (2004), observing abnormal return volatility around 
earning announcements, conclude that information flow increased after Regulation FD, 
with small firms bearing a larger impact. Bushee et al. (2004) examine price volatility 
and individual investors’ trading activity during periods around conference calls. They 
believe that the high price volatility after Regulation FD reveals that price is more infor-
mative following its implementation. Similarly, Ahmed and Scheible (2007) find that the 
regulation reduces the differences in information quality among investors. 
To sum up, a large amount of research has been done on the market behaviour ap-
proach, and the general results support the SEC’s achievement of a better capital market 
environment. 
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2.1.2.2 The analysts’ information effect approach 
Early research in this approach focuses mostly on analysts’ forecasts. For instance, 
Heflin et al. (2003) and Bailey et al. (2003) both study market behaviour and analysts’ 
behaviour, but they obtain dissimilar results about analysts’ forecast dispersion: Heflin et 
al. (2003) find no change in forecast dispersion while Bailey et al. (2003) observe an in-
crease. However, both agree that there is no change in analysts’ forecast accuracy, one of 
the key factors in Regulation FD studies. Although Heflin et al. (2003) observe a smaller 
forecast error, and they explain that other factors beyond the regulation change, such as 
the economic environment, may have lead to the decline. 
The majority of studies on analysts’ behaviour come out after 2005 with innova-
tive ideas. While Agrawal et al. (2006) and Yang and Mensah (2006) still focus on the 
analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion, Mohanram and Sunder (2006) focus more on a 
dynamic view that analysts are putting more effort into searching out their own sources of 
information after Regulation FD. In their opinion, analysts now switch their focus from 
well-followed firms to less followed firms to capture unique information discovery. Large 
brokerage analysts lose their superior forecast power, which levels the playing field. 
Likewise, Gintschel and Markov (2004) notice that highly ranked brokerage houses and 
optimistic analysts are affected by Regulation FD to a greater degree. However, by ex-
cluding high-tech firms from their sample, in order to control for the economic recession 
coincident with Regulation FD, Gomes et al. (2007) find that analysts shift to large firms 
after the regulation is implemented. Ferreira and Smith (2006) also study the information 
changes of analysts rating. They find that investors continue to respond to analysts’ rec-
ommendations in the same way as before. 
On the other hand, Arya et al. (2005) stand on the critical side of the regulation. In 
their theoretical model, selective disclosure can stave off analysts herding behaviour be-
cause parties are able to incorporate a more diverse set of information into their reports. 
The regulation, by ruling out the practice of selective disclosure, heightens herding be-
haviour and leaves investors worse off. As a response, Mensah and Yang (2008) apply a 
similar empirical model and they find that Regulation FD does not increase herding be-
haviour, but slightly increases “anti-herding” behaviour instead. 
As an alternative to equity analysis, Jorion et al. (2005) study the impact of 
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Regulation FD on credit analysis. They observe an increase in the information content of 
rating changes after the regulation. One explanation for this result is that credit analysis is 
excluded from FD’s blacklist. Nevertheless, it is found that the increase is more pro-
nounced for larger firms with a greater analyst following. The evidence overwhelmingly 
shows that the SEC achieves its goal to limit the practice of selective disclosure, espe-
cially for large firms. 
In conclusion, most of academic researchers agree that there is little impairment 
to analysts’ ability, but results in this approach are still unsettled. 
2.1.2.3 The information asymmetry approach 
One reason that the SEC arranged to stop the practice of selective disclosure is 
related to its goals to maintain investors’ confidence and belief in the integrity of the 
capital markets. Selective disclosure, by causing information asymmetry between in-
formed traders and dealers and uninformed traders, grants a small portion of market par-
ticipants with superior ability to profit from private information to the detriment of ordi-
nary, uninformed investors. Stimulated by this problem, the third approach to studying 
Regulation FD directly concerns whether the regulation solves the selective disclosure 
problem or not. Two main methods used by researchers are: (1) to examine the informa-
tion asymmetry with the bid-ask spread and (2) to estimate the probability of informa-
tion-based trading. 
The bid-ask spread method. Basically, the bid-ask spread is considered to be composed 
of four parts: order-processing cost, inventory-holding cost, monopoly charges or compe-
tition discounts, and adverse selection cost due to information asymmetry between deal-
ers and informed traders (Huang and Stoll, 1997). The pioneers of the adverse selection 
approach to studying Regulation FD assume that the first three parts are unaffected by 
information dissemination changes associated with the implementation of the regulation. 
In this case, any changes in bid-ask spread would reflect changes in information asym-
metry. Sunder (2002) tests the difference in bid-ask spread between matched pairs of 
“open” and “restricted” firms during pre- and post-regulation periods. Sunder finds that 
after the regulation, the difference in bid-ask spread between the two groups is eliminated. 
Her result suggests that Regulation FD helps to reduce the level of information asymme-
try in the stock market. Although Sunder’s result is in favour of the SEC’s goal, her 
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methodology is criticized by several other authors, since the other three components of 
the bid-ask spread could also be influenced by the regulation. 
Further studies extend Sunder’s (2002) work by decomposing the adverse selec-
tion part separately from the bid-ask spread through various theoretical models. Straser 
(2002) and Eleswarapu et al. (2004) both use Huang and Stoll’s (1996) model, but reach 
contradictory conclusions. While Straser observes a higher adverse selection component 
after the regulation, Eleswarapu et al. find that at earning announcements, this component 
declined, and the decrease is more pronounced for smaller and less liquid stocks. Later, 
by jointly applying three other models to decompose the adverse selection component, 
Chiyachantana et al. (2004) confirm that Regulation FD does help to reduce information 
asymmetry. On the other hand, Lee et al. (2004) find no significant change in the adverse 
selection component, whereas Sidhu et al. (2008) find that the adverse selection compo-
nent increases after Regulation FD. 
The probability of information-based trading method. The inconsistent results from 
the bid-ask spread approach suggest that researchers may need to explore new measure-
ments of the degree of selective disclosure. The probability of informed trading approach 
is one of the most feasible. There are several theoretical models available for this ap-
proach, such as Easley et al.’s (1996) (EKOP) model used by Straser (2002) and Duarte 
et al. (2008) and the Hasbrouck (1991) model used by Collver (2007). 
Under the EKOP setting, Straser (2002) uses a sample of 137 days of intraday 
data for 130 matched pairs to examine the impact of Regulation FD on “open” and 
“closed” firms respectively.8 It is shown that PIN increases after Regulation FD. To ex-
plain the result, Straser separates market leaked information into two parts, the private 
information and the private component of public information. According to Straser, as 
private information decreases with the prohibition of selective disclosure, analysts put 
more effort into finding signals from public information. As a result, financial analysts 
discover more from public messages, and the private component of public information 
                                                 
8 According to Straser (2001, pg 10) “open” firms “consist of companies that claim to have provided public 
disclosure of all material information as required by Regulation FD prior to its institution.” While “closed” 
firms “consist of companies that prior to Regulation FD released their information strictly to analysts 
and/or shareholders.” The classification is developed from the results of a Business Week survey in August 
2000. 
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increases. This increase in the private component outweighs the decrease of selectively 
leaked information, and thus the overall PIN increases. 
Straser uses a relatively small sample in her study because of the need to control 
for pair matching. Duarte et al. (2008) supplement Straser’s work by using 3,000 firms 
from NYSE and over 2,000 firms from NASDAQ, and a longer event window period is 
applied as well. They find a marginally significant increase in the median of PIN, and the 
significance is further weakened by their firm level chi-squared tests. They do not pro-
vide an explicit explanation for the result. Collver (2007) extends this approach by ap-
plying Hasbrouck’s (1991) summary informativeness statistic to measure informed trad-
ing. A decrease in the informed trading index is observed. 
2.1.2.4 The corporate governance approach 
This approach is less developed compared to the previous three approaches. 
Studies about this approach focus on testing how firms react to the regulation, and most 
of them provide a descriptive background check. For example, Straser (2002), Heflin et al. 
(2003) and Bailey et al. (2003) observe that firms’ public disclosure increases in general, 
especially in the first quarter right after regulation FD. Bushee et al. (2004) find that the 
regulation has a small negative impact on managers’ decision to hold conference calls. 
Obviously, since Regulation FD is a rule affecting firms’ disclosure activities, new 
features in the corporation information environment may emerge, which could lead to 
changes in corporate capital structure and corporate governance. For instance, different 
degrees of information disclosure could alter the information asymmetry between share-
holders and managers, and could change the cost for potential shareholders to seek in-
formation about stocks. Duarte et al. (2008) show that while NYSE/AMEX stocks’ cost 
of capital has no significant change, the cost of capital of NASDAQ stocks experiences a 
moderate increase. Gomes et al. (2007) also observe a rising cost of capital, mostly in 
small firms.  
The above review of various studies on Regulation FD highlights the conflicts 
that arise between the SEC’s goals and the actual outcome, and suggests the importance 
of further understanding the cost and benefits of the regulation. This has important im-
plications for other jurisdictions considering the implementation of similar regulations on 
information disclosure. 
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2.2 Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure 
“The information disclosed…describes what the corporate insiders want to be 
disclosed about the corporation’s activities and performance.” (Melis, 2004, pg 32) 
The conflict of interest between principle and agent is one of the most frequently 
studied problems in finance. In a business entity, such conflict arises between sharehold-
ers and management, or ownership and control. If there is not an effective method to re-
strict managers’ behaviour, they can easily expropriate investors’ money for their own 
interest. The incentive of expropriating investors’ money can lead the managers to behave 
in two ways: they may cheat existing investors, and/or they may cheat potential investors. 
The former activity is called the “agency problem” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); and the 
latter activity is called the “information problem” (or “lemon problem,” Akerlof, 1970).  
When investors enter the capital market with their savings, their investment selec-
tion criteria are usually based on information that is provided by managers. If managers 
do not disclose all relevant information that reflects firms’ value, then investors may have 
biased estimates of value, and hence they may make unsuitable investment choices. On 
the other hand, after savings are placed into the firms, investors often do not show much 
interest in actively participating in management activities. Therefore, investors’ impres-
sion of firm value relies heavily on manager’s clarification, which gives managers the 
opportunity to engage in self-serving behaviour.  
The above analysis explains the importance of information disclosure as a key 
element in solving the conflict of interest problem and in protecting shareholder rights. In 
the current capital market, business entities are required to disclose accounting informa-
tion. Additional information can be provided on a voluntary basis. Since mandatory dis-
closure is a minimum requirement of corporate disclosure, most academic studies focus 
on voluntary disclosure decisions. 
There exist various explanations about why firms make voluntary disclosure. Ba-
sically, six motives are mentioned in previous literature: the capital markets transactions 
hypothesis, the corporate control contest hypothesis, the stock compensation hypothesis, 
the litigation cost hypothesis, the management talent signalling hypothesis, and the pro-
prietary cost hypothesis (Healy and Palepu, 2001). The capital market hypothesis claims 
that mangers use voluntary disclosure as a tool to solve the “lemon problem,” to reduce 
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information asymmetry on the capital market, and thus reduce the cost of capital when 
they seek external financing. The corporate control contest hypothesis says that managers 
voluntarily disclose additional information to explain poor performance when they feel 
the firm is undervalued and when managers face the possibility of job loss. The stock 
compensation hypothesis says that managers publish news to avoid being classed as “in-
siders” when they exercise their options or trade their stocks. And they also disclose in-
formation to allow accurate valuation before issuing option or stock compensation. The 
litigation cost hypothesis has two sides; managers could increase voluntary disclosure to 
avoid being sued for inadequate disclosure, or they could decrease disclosure, especially 
around earning forecast announcements, if they are afraid that their information is biased 
or inaccurate. The management talent signalling hypothesis states that managers are more 
likely to disclose good news in order to distinguish themselves from their colleagues. Fi-
nally, the proprietary cost hypothesis argues that managers’ decision about whether to 
disclose certain information depends on their belief about whether the news will reduce 
firm value. They choose not to disclose if the news is likely to “damage the competitive 
position” (Healy and Palepu, 2001, pg 424).  
While each of the above hypotheses has its own rationale and empirical evidence, 
their common theme is the relationship between managers and investors, interpreted as a 
balance of power. Therefore, we seek to identify a clear relationship between corporate 
governance and voluntary disclosure. Core (2001) breaks down the voluntary disclosure 
process into two steps. First, firms decide their optimal disclosure policy based on devel-
oping needs, which are usually decided by cross-sectional differences. For example, firms 
with differing degrees of commitment to industrial standards may apply different disclo-
sure policies. Then, as news arrives, the firm’s corporate governance determines the 
firm’s ability to enforce its optimal disclosure policy. 
In our study, when the regulatory environment allows it, managers may choose 
between making public announcements to all investors and selectively disclosing the 
news to certain parties. Selective disclosure allows managers the opportunity to act in 
their own interest against the interests of ordinary shareholders, creating the possibility of 
an agency problem. Therefore corporate governance does not determine the absolute de-
gree of firms’ voluntary disclosure, but it rather determines the relative position in volun-
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tary disclosure. For instance, if the power of shareholders is relatively strong, then man-
agers will be less likely to use information for their own interest, whereas if the power of 
management is relatively strong, there will be few restrictions on how managers disclose 
information. This is how we link corporate governance to how managers make voluntary 
disclosure. 
As Eng and Mak (2003) stated, the link between disclosure and corporate gov-
ernance is first noted by Williamson (1981). Since then there have been many studies 
testing the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in the U.S. 
as well as globally.9 On the corporate governance side, most of the above research fo-
cuses on ownership structure and board composition as proxies for the balance of power 
between shareholders and managers. Researchers using ownership structure as measure-
ment proxies focus on management ownership (Eng and Mak, 2003, and Ruland et al., 
1990), large outside shareholder ownership (Eng and Mak, 2003, and Ruland et al., 1990), 
institutional ownership (El-Gazzar, 1998, and Schadewitz and Blevins, 1998), and gov-
ernment ownership (Eng and Mak, 2003). While researchers using board composition as 
measurement proxies focus on the proportion of independent directors on the board (Eng 
and Mak, 2003, Ho and Wong, 2001, and Forker, 1992), the existence of an audit com-
mittee on the board (Forker, 1992, Ho and Wong, 2001, Collier, 1993, and McMullen, 
1996), the existence of a dominant person in the firm (Forker, 1992, and Ho and Wong, 
2001), and the existence of a related person on the board (Ho and Wong, 2001).  
Meanwhile, on the voluntary disclosure side, most of studies focus on either the 
amount of voluntary disclosure (Ruland et al., 1990, El-Gazzar, 1998, and Schadewitz 
and Blevins, 1998), or the quality of voluntary disclosure measured by self-constructed 
scores or AIMR scores based on analysts rating (Eng and Mak, 2003, and Lang and Lun-
holm, 1993). To our knowledge, only Holland (1998) provides descriptive incentives for 
the structural difference in voluntary disclosure choices, but Holland does not specify the 
internal and endogenous relationship between corporate governance and voluntary dis-
closure structure as we put forward in this thesis. 
                                                 
9 See for example, Ruland et al. (1990) in the United States, McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) in Austra-
lia, Meek et al. (1995) in United Kingdom and Continental European, Ben Ali et al. (2007) in France, Ho 
and Wong (2001) in Hong Kong, and Eng and Mak (2003) in Singapore. 
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2.3 Voluntary Disclosure and Information Asymmetry 
“…companies identified two distinct or extreme areas for corporate disclosure. 
The first was where market failure created a clear-cut domain for private disclosure only. 
The second was where regulation created a distinct area for mandatory public disclosure. 
In between these two … lay a wide area for company discretion concerning public versus 
private disclosure choices.” (Holland, 1998, pg 29) 
The information structure of a firm refers to the three categories of information 
within a firm: that subject to mandatory disclosure, that which is voluntarily disclosed, 
and that which is undisclosed. Of the information that is disclosed, managers can either 
publish news through a public channel, (e.g. filling SEC forms, issuing press release, etc.), 
or they can release news to privileged groups through a selective channel, (e.g. public 
limited conference calls, presentations to brokerage houses, meetings with institutional 
shareholders, reports to analysts, etc.). In this thesis, we refer to these as public disclosure 
and selective disclosure respectively. 
Evidence suggests that voluntary public information can reduce the level of in-
formation asymmetry among market participants, and thus can help to form a sound and 
efficient market. Analytically, Barry and Brown (1985), Diamond (1985), Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991) and Kim and Verrecchia (1994) argue that more information generally 
reduces information risk on prices; likewise voluntary disclosure serves to reduce infor-
mation asymmetry among traders. Empirically, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Healy et al. 
(1999) and Welker (1995) investigate links between voluntary disclosure and stock li-
quidity. Their findings are mixed. While Welker and Leuz and Verrecchia find that firms 
with better quality disclosure have lower bid-ask spreads, Healy et al. find that firms with 
a larger amount of disclosure have significantly higher bid-ask spreads. In addition, 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002) test the capital market effect of voluntary disclosure on the 
cost of capital, and they find that the cost of capital decreases with more disclosure. Tra-
belsi et al. (2004) and Trabelsi et al. (2008) study the performance pattern and incentives 
of internet financial reporting, and find that internet disclosure helps to reduce analysts’ 
forecasting error. Most (but not all) of the above evidence is consistent with the idea that 
public voluntary disclosure serves to reduce information asymmetry and information risk. 
On the other hand, there is not much documentation on the capital market conse-
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quence of private information. Admati (1985) , Wang (1993), Dow and Gorton (1995) 
and Easley and O’Hara (2004) all model the activities of informed and uninformed trad-
ers, and they find that because of the different degree of available information, informed 
traders and uninformed traders invest in different portfolios. Specifically, informed trad-
ers construct their portfolios on the efficient frontier associated with their superior infor-
mation. Since uninformed traders have inferior information, they cannot “replicate” the 
informed traders’ portfolios, thus their portfolios will always locate below the informed 
traders’ efficient frontier. As selective disclosure causes information asymmetry to arise 
between these two parties, it makes informed traders better off at the expense of unin-
formed traders.  
Easley and O’Hara (2004) develop a framework to consider both public informa-
tion and private information together. They provide an analytical model to demonstrate 
how a firm’s information structure affects its capital market behaviour. Their finding 
suggests that for stocks with more private information and less public information, unin-
formed investors require a higher rate of return as compensation because more private 
information increases information asymmetry and the information risk uninformed in-
vestors face. Easley and O’Hara (2004) pg 1578 conclude “If, as our analysis suggests, 
the quality of information affects asset pricing, then how information is provided to the 
market is clearly important.” Although they claim that the results of Easley et al. (2002) 
can be viewed as an empirical test of their analysis, in fact Easley et al. (2002) test the 
different roles of private and public information independently, rather than testing both 
simultaneously. To our knowledge, there are no empirical studies examining this issue 
directly.  
The association between concepts discussed in section 2.1 (the role of Regulation 
Fair Disclosure), section 2.2 (corporate governance and voluntary disclosure), and section 
2.3 (voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry) is as follows: As an internal force, 
the balance of power between shareholders and management decides how managers fol-
low the corporation’s optimal disclosure policy, and the relative position is reflected as 
the information structure of the firm, which decides the level of information asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed traders. To test the endogenous level of corporate 
governance as the internal force, we study Regulation FD and treat it as an external force 
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on the firm’s information structure. 
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CHAPTER III 
SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
3.1 Main Regression Variables 
3.1.1 PIN 
In this thesis we use the probability of information-based trading (PIN) as a proxy 
to measure the level of information asymmetry among market participants. Ranging from 
0 to 1, PIN estimates the probability that any random trade is made by an informed trader. 
A large PIN value is associated with a high level of information asymmetry.10 PIN is de-
rived by Easley et al. (1996) (EKOP, hereafter) from a microstructure model mimicking 
the trading process in a risk-neutral, perfectly competitive market. The game tree in Fig-
ure 3.1 describes the trading process.  
[Insert Figure 3.1 
Tree Diagram of the Trading Process] 
An information event may occur at the beginning of each day with probability . 
A low signal arrives with conditional probability , and a high signal with conditional 
probability 1 – . If the information event does not occur, then only uninformed traders 
trade in the market, and although it is not strictly necessary, EKOP assumes buy orders 
and sell orders arrive at the same rate . Informed traders arrive at the rate , but they 
trade only on days in which an information event has occurred. Therefore, given a low 
signal on a particular day, the seller arrival rate is  + , and the buyer arrival rate is  
because informed traders sell their shares but do not buy after observing the low signal. 
Similarly, when there is a high signal, the seller arrival rate is , and the buyer arrival rate 
is  + . The parameters , ,  and  are estimated using maximum likelihood based on 
the number of buy orders and sell orders observed each day. Assuming that the arrivals 
follow independent Poisson processes, the estimation of PIN is given as 
                                                 
10 Duarte and Young (2009) and Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) discuss whether PIN is associated with the cost of 
capital. Our study, using PIN as a measurement of risk, does not involve this issue. 
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ܲܫܰ ൌ ߙߤߙߤ ൅ 2ߝ. (1)
Our PIN data are obtained from the website of Professor Stephen Brown of 
Maryland University. Brown calculates quarterly PIN estimates for the entire database of 
the Centre of Research on Security Price (CRSP) from the first quarter of 1993 to the 
second quarter of 2006. The sample includes stocks listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ).  
To be compatible with the other variables in this research, the quarterly PIN data 
are converted to annual data by taking the arithmetic average of the four quarters each 
year, ignoring all missing values. To achieve a better estimation of the effect of Regula-
tion FD, a maximum symmetric time frame surrounding the event year 2000 is selected 
as the event window, containing eleven years of data from 1995 to 2005.  
The parameters ,  and  which EKOP use to derive PIN are estimated using a 
likelihood function suggested by Easley et al. (1996) using  
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(2)
Here B and S are the estimated daily numbers of buy and sell orders, with trade 
signs being estimated using Lee and Ready’s (1991) algorithm, and T is the number of 
days in each estimation period (quarters in Brown’s calculation). 
Previous studies, such as Easley et al. (2002), Vega (2006) and Yan and Zhang 
(2006), are concerned about the possible situation in which corner solutions may lead to 
biased PIN estimation. For example, Yan and Zhang (2006) illustrate a case in which PIN 
has the correct estimation if  is between 0 and 1. However, if  equals 0, PIN becomes 0, 
and if  equals 1, PIN increases from 0.131 to as large as 0.801. Such problems require 
special attention. Although the possible effect of corner solutions cannot be fully ruled 
out, the negative impacts can be reduced by filtering out questionable extreme values in 
the PIN data.  
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[Insert Table 3.1 
PIN Data Distribution by Every 0.1] 
As listed in Table 3.1, about 84% of PIN observations lie within the range 0.1-0.4. 
The percentage of each category descends gradually as the range increases. However, the 
range 0.9-1.0 contains fully 10 percent more observations than range 0.8-0.9. 
[Insert Table 3.2 
0.90-1.00 PIN Data Distribution by Every 0.01] 
Table 3.2 further decomposes the range 0.9-1.0 by a finer partition of 0.01. It 
turns out that most observations lie in the sub-range 0.99-1.00. If PIN equals 1, then for 
the specific firm during the particular period, information events happen on every trading 
day and uninformed traders’ arrival rate is zero. Although theoretically this possibility 
cannot be fully ruled out, we believe that the unusually high number of PIN observations 
close to 1 is a consequence of a parameter corner solution problem rather than a meas-
urement of extremely frequent information events.  
[Insert Table 3.3 
0.00-0.10 PIN Data Distribution by Every 0.01] 
Similarly, the range 0.0-0.1 is further investigated. As shown in Table 3.3, there 
exists an unusual number of observations in the sub-range 0.00-0.01, and theoretically it 
means that almost no information event occurs for the specific firm during the particular 
period. Although firms could choose to keep their financial status and operating activities 
transparent enough to the public, we believe this is emblimatic of problematic parameter 
estimations. Therefore, the suspicious PIN data in the ranges 0.00-0.01 and 0.99-1.00 are 
excluded from further analysis to maintain a more precise estimation of the information 
asymmetry on the capital market.  
[Insert Figure 3.2 
Plot of quarterly and annual PIN during 1993 and 2006] 
Figure 3.2 shows how the quarterly mean and the annual mean of PIN behave 
from 1993 to 2006. A downward trend is observed during the period, which means that 
information asymmetry tends to become lower as time goes by. Such a trend could be the 
result of introducing advanced communications technology, implementing new arbitrage 
techniques, or changing trading habits of market participants such as an increased preva-
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lence of day trading, etc. As in Figure 3.2, the trend seems to become steeper after 2001, 
the year after Regulation FD is implemented. Although there could be other possible ex-
planations, it could be that the implementation of Regulation FD plays an important role 
in the falling tendency of the information asymmetry level. Also, PIN displays a low 
value every year in the first quarter, suggesting strong seasonality. In fact, when the Win-
ters Smoothing Method is applied, the null hypotheses that the seasonality parameter 
equals zero and the trend parameter equals zero are strongly rejected. 
3.1.2 The G Index 
In this study, the balance of power in corporate governance is measured by the 
Corporate Governance Index (G) constructed by Gompers et al. (2003). The original data 
source is the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC). The IRRC generates a 
non-exclusive list of corporate anti-takeover provisions for publicly listed firms every 
two or three years in Corporate Takeover Defences (Rosenbaum 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2004, 2006). According to Bebchuk et al. (2009, pg 796) “[i]n any given 
year of publication, the firms in the IRRC volume accounted for more than 90% of the 
total U.S. stock market capitalization”. The IRRC gathers its data from a variety of public 
sources, for example, “corporate by-laws and charters, proxy statements, annual reports” 
and “10-K and 10-Q documents filed with the SEC” (Gompers et al., 2003, pg 110). 
[Insert Table 3.4 
IRRC Corporate Governance Provisions] 
Gompers et al. (2003) construct the G Index with the IRRC corporate governance 
provisions. A list of the provisions is presented in Table 3.4. They generally limit share-
holder activism and increase managers’ ability to curtail shareholders activism, for exam-
ple, by allowing managers to defend a hostile takeover. The G index is constructed by 
giving one point to a firm if the firm adopts a provision on the list. Only two of the 
twenty-eight provisions are considered pro shareholders, namely Cumulative Voting and 
Secret Ballot. For the two exceptions, points are added to firms that do not adopt the pro-
visions. Therefore, a higher G index is associated with more controlling power residing 
with managers relative to shareholders, it is more difficult for shareholders to replace 
managers, and corporate governance is weaker. In addition, both firm-level provisions 
and state-level laws are listed by the IRRC, and some of them have the same core con-
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cepts thus can be viewed as mutual substitutes. To address this overlapping problem, only 
one point is given no matter whether the firm has only one of the provisions or both. 
Hence the G index has a theoretical possible range from 0 to 24. 
The G data is obtained from Yale University’s Professor Andrew Metrick’s per-
sonal webpage, and it contains 5,624 firms with 14,000 observations from 1990 to 2006. 
The G data has two identifiers: company name and exchange ticker. We match it with the 
CRSP database to associate each firm with a CRSP permanent number. To begin with, the 
ticker symbol is used with the effective date of the exchange ticker data in CRSP and the 
date in G data are matched as a supplement. After this step, 4,952 firms with 11,376 ob-
servations are matched, and 2,713 observations remain unsettled. We then manually 
match the remaining firms. Our hand checking process is composed of three rounds. First, 
firms with the same tickers but different ways of recording names in the two datasets are 
picked out. Then, we examine full names of the firms recorded by abbreviated characters 
in either data set and match them together. In the final round we exam the incorporation 
states and company history of each firm including mergers, acquisitions, delisting, share 
buy-backs, name changes, and so on. 13,847 observations in G dataset are matched with 
the CRSP database totally. A list of the sample construction process on G is presented in 
Figure 3.3. 
Since the IRRC do not publish reports every year, the G data is only available for 
the reporting years: 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. Following 
Gompers et al. (2003), the gaps between reporting years are filled by assuming that the G 
value for each firm is constant until the value is updated in the next report. Thus a firm’s 
G value equals its previous reported value in non-reporting years. The G dataset is ex-
panded to 28,573 observations after this step. Next, we match the G dataset with the PIN 
dataset which returns 21,251 firm-year observations. In particular, there are 16,993 ob-
servations for the event window 1995 to 2005. 
[Insert Figure 3.3 
Sample Construction Process of G and 
Table 3.5 
Summary Statistics of G by Reporting Year] 
Table 3.5 presents the summary statistics of G for each reporting year. Following 
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Gompers et al. (2003), G is grouped into 3 subsets. Firms with values less than 6 are al-
located to the “Low” group, and firms with values above 13 are allocated to the “High” 
group. The rest are allocated to the “Medium” group. The “Low” group contains 10.1% 
of the entire sample, and the “High” group contains 5.01%. The mean and the median of 
G remain constant between 1990 and 2006. The standard deviation of G becomes lower 
through time. As in Table 3.5, both percentage of the “High” group and percentage of the 
“Low” group drop continuously from 1990 to 2006, and the percentage of observations 
with the median value of G, 9, grows. The distribution of G becomes more concentrated 
through time. 
In 1998 the IRRC expands its database by 28% with the inclusion of over three 
hundred new firms. Most of these are small firms with extremely low G values. The 
population mean drops more than 5 percent in 1998, mostly because the “Low” group 
grows by 184 percent in that year. In their next report in 2000, the IRRC excludes many 
of these firms. 
3.2  Control Variables 
3.2.1 Analysts Following 
Previous literature has shown that coverage by financial analysts is one of the de-
terminants of market liquidity and information asymmetry. For example, Skinner (1990) 
and Brennan et al. (1993) find that firms with a larger analysts’ coverage incorporate 
news into price quickly, and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) find that adverse selec-
tion cost is lower for firms with a higher analyst following. Specifically, Easley et al. 
(1998) and Duarte et al. (2008) use PIN as a proxy for market information asymmetry 
and find that PIN becomes lower with higher analysts coverage. Therefore, we consider 
analysts’ following to be an important control variable for PIN. 
The Annual Analysts Following Index (AAF) is gathered and converted from the 
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) data. The I/B/E/S database contains 
monthly recommendation data collected from analysts’ forecasting reports by Thomson 
Reuters Inc. Our I/B/E/S monthly data has 12,925 firms with 867,848 observations, cov-
ering a period from November 1993 to December 2007. The primary identifiers for 
I/B/E/S are I/B/E/S tickers, CUSIP numbers, stock exchange tickers, and company names 
are also provided as secondary identifiers. We follow the Wharton Research Data Service 
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method to match I/B/E/S with the CRSP database. First, the two datasets are linked by 
CUSIP numbers. Then, the unmatched data from the first round are linked by exchange 
tickers and effective periods. 7,491 stocks with 637,351 observations are matched in total, 
consisting 73% of the original I/B/E/S dataset. To be consistent with the other variables, 
these monthly formatted data are converted into yearly format by taking the arithmetic 
average of the 12 months each year. The output, AFF data set, contains 51,963 observa-
tions. After merging AAF with G and PIN by CRSP permanent number, 15,406 valid ob-
servations remain. A summary of the above mentioned sample construction process is 
shown in Figure 3.4. 
[Insert Figure 3.4 
Main Regression Variables Construction Process] 
3.2.2 Other Control Variables 
Effects of many other control variables on PIN are also tested in previous litera-
ture. We consider some of them here in this thesis.  
3.2.2.1 Market characteristics 
Trading Volume. The impact of trading volume on PIN is tested by Easley et al. (1996) 
and Dennis and Weston (2001). The data used in this thesis is from the CRSP database. It 
is converted from monthly form to annual form by the same method as the analysts fol-
lowing data described in Section 3.2.1 
Capitalization. Previous research tests the impact of market capitalization on PIN 
(Brown et al., 2004 and Easley et al., 2002). Moreover, Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) 
find that PIN and firm size have a negative correlation. We get the annual year-end mar-
ket capitalization data from the CRSP database. 
3.2.2.2 Institutional characteristics 
Book-to-Market Ratio. The relationship between book-to-market ratio and PIN is tested 
in Easley et al. (2002). They show that the book-to-market ratio is positively correlated 
with PIN. Also, Gompers et al. (2003) test the relationship between G and 
book-to-market ratio and they find a positive correlation. Data of annual book value per 
share is obtained from Compustat, and year-end market price is collected from CRSP. 
They are matched by the initial eight digits of CUSIP identifiers. 
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Institutional Ownership. Previous research, such as Brown et al. (2004) and Dennis and 
Weston (2001), also examine the impact of institutional ownership on PIN. We use the 
block holder data obtained from Andrew Metrick’s personal webpage. Metrick provides 
block holders’ data from 1996 to 2001 based on IRRC survey data. The sample of the 
block holder data includes S&P 500 stocks as well as large firms frequently mentioned in 
business journals. The “Sumblks” variable, which is the percentage held by all block 
holders for that firm-year, is used in our research as a proxy for institutional ownership. 
To fit Metrick’s data into our event window period, the block holder value in 1995 is as-
sumed the same as in 1996, and block holder values from 2002 to 2005 are assumed un-
changed since 2001.11  
 There are 5,285 observations in the merged dataset for regression analysis. A list 
of regression variables and detailed definitions are presented in Table 3.6. The summary 
sample statistics of each variable and their correlations are presented in Tables 3.7 and 
3.8. 
[Insert Table 3.6 
Definitions of Regression Variables, 
Table 3.7 
Summary Statistics of Regression Variables 
Table 3.8 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Regression Variables and 
Table 3.9 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Regression Variables on Regulation FD] 
Table 3.8 reports the results of Pearson correlation coefficients the correlations 
among PIN, G and the control variables. Information asymmetry level is negatively asso-
ciated with corporate governance, the annual average analysts’ following number, market 
capitalization and trading volume, and it is positively associated with the book-to-market 
value and institutional ownership. It suggests that for strongly governed firms, the level 
of information asymmetry is relatively low, while for weakly governed firms, the infor-
mation asymmetry level is relatively high. The correlations between AAF and Capitaliza-
                                                 
11 The mean of Sumblks grows inconstantly from 21.65 to 25.01 between 1996 and 2001, but without fur-
ther guidance, we assume it remains constant thereafter. 
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tion, AAF and Volume, and Capitalization and Volume are relatively high with values at 
0.422, 0.481 and 0.522. Since high correlation between independent variables could pos-
sibly lead to multicollinearity problems, when running the full regressions these three 
variables are carefully examined by dropping each of them at a time to see how the coef-
ficients of the other variables change. It is shown that dropping any of the three variables 
do not lead to substantial changes in the full regression results. The baseline regressions 
also help to explain this issue. 
A comparison of the correlation coefficients for the main regression variables be-
fore and after Regulation FD is included in Table 3.9. The time horizon is between 1995 
and 2005. The years 1995 to 1999 are recognized as pre-Regulation FD, and the years 
2001 to 2005 are recognized as post-Regulation FD. The implementation year 2000 is 
excluded from the correlation analysis. Fisher’s Z Transformation is used to examine 
whether significant differences exist between the correlation coefficients. A notable result 
in Panel A is that the correlation value between PIN and G decreases by 49% after Regu-
lation FD, which is significant at the 5% level, suggesting that the corporate govern-
ance-information asymmetry relationship is less reliable when there is a restriction on 
selective disclosure. 
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CHAPTER IV 
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1  Hypotheses 
With respect to the interaction between information asymmetry and firm’s corpo-
rate governance, we derive the following related questions. 
 Does the balance of power between shareholders and mangers influence the level of 
information asymmetry? If so, then how does it influence? To what degree and 
through what path? Are the patterns the same for different levels of corporate gov-
ernance? 
 Is the relationship between corporate governance and information asymmetry af-
fected by changes in the disclosure method? Does Regulation FD achieve its desired 
goal to force firms to publicly disclose the information which was selectively dis-
closed prior to the regulation? 
4.1.1 Corporate Governance, Disclosure, and Information Asymmetry 
A firm’s disclosure policy is designed to fulfill its development needs. These 
needs are unique for each individual firm. They are different across industries and across 
firms in different developing phases, and vary with the firm’s commitment to its inves-
tors.12 When new information arrives that is not mandated to be disclosed by regulations, 
the optimal disclosure policy indicates whether the information should be disclosed, and 
managers ultimately decide whether and through which channel, public or selective, the 
information should be issued. However, to what degree the manager can make choices 
which reflect her personal interest is determined by the firm’s corporate governance. This 
firm-level disclosure decision process is outlined in Figure 4.1. 
[Insert Figure 4.1 
Disclosure Decision Process] 
As we discussed in Chapter II, a firm’s disclosure method, or information struc-
ture, has a significant effect on the level of information asymmetry among investors. 
Public disclosure delivers the firm’s financial status and operating activities to all inves-
                                                 
12 See Core (2001) for a detailed discussion about the literature on this topic. 
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tors thus reducing information asymmetry, and selective disclosure delivers such infor-
mation to particular groups and thus increases information asymmetry. For our informa-
tion asymmetry measurement proxy PIN, public disclosure decreases the probability of a 
private information event α, thus PIN decreases; while selective disclosure decreases α 
and PIN increases. The path through which corporate governance affects market informa-
tion asymmetry level is shown in Figure 4.2. 
[Insert Figure 4.2 
Information Impact Path] 
Our theory suggests that the disclosure channel is the intermediary through which 
corporate governance affects market behaviour, and we clearly describe the path through 
which corporate governance affects a firm’s voluntary disclosure method.13 Also, we test 
the relative impact of public and selective disclosure on information asymmetry simulta-
neously. To our knowledge, there is no previous work that clearly examines these points. 
Hypothesis 1a: (Untestable in our framework) Firms with better corporate governance 
(i.e. more shareholder power) use more public and fewer selective disclosure methods. 
Hypothesis 1b: (Testable) Firms with better corporate governance have less information 
asymmetry in the capital market. 
Hypothesis 1c: (Testable) There is a threshold level of corporate governance beyond 
which improved corporate governance has little influence on the disclosure method and 
the level of information asymmetry. In particular, the corporate governance-information 
asymmetry relationship is more pronounced for poorly governed firms. 
4.1.2 Regulation FD and Disclosure Method 
Regulation FD aims to stop the practice of selective disclosure to develop a sound 
and efficient capital market. All information needs to go public once a selective disclo-
sure is made. Therefore, Regulation FD can be viewed as an external force that alters a 
corporation’s disclosure method. The function of the regulation on disclosure and its 
connection with corporate governance and information asymmetry is shown in Figure 
4.3.  
                                                 
13 Masulis et al. (2007) examine how governance provisions affect shareholder wealth through the invest-
ment choice channel.  
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[Insert Figure 4.3 
Internal and External Forces on Disclosure Structure] 
The effectiveness of Regulation FD is of great importance to both policy makers 
and other stakeholders. As we discussed in Chapter II, previous research examines the 
regulation through several different approaches, including market behaviour, analysts’ 
reactions, information asymmetry proxies, and firm reactions. While the first three ap-
proaches analyze market outcomes, some studies using the last approach focus directly 
on the change in disclosure method. However, because whether certain news was to be 
selectively disclosed or publicly disclosed cannot be distinguished without Regulation FD, 
there is no established way to directly measure the change of disclosure method affected 
by the regulation. So far, most studies using this approach focus on investigating the 
change on the quantities of public disclosure as a substitute.14 Our research tests Regula-
tion FD from a different aspect. Because the disclosure method is unobservable, and it 
plays a crucial function in the connection illustrated in Figure 4.3, we test the relationship 
between corporate governance and information asymmetry instead, and then we examine 
the impact of Regulation FD on this relationship. If corporate governance stands as an 
internal force affecting the disclosure method and the regulation stands as an external 
force, then how these two forces interact to form the disclosure method and further affect 
information asymmetry in the capital market is of great interest to academics and practi-
tioners. 
Hypothesis 2a: Regulation FD, as an external force on disclosure method reduces the ef-
fect of corporate governance on information asymmetry. 
Hypothesis 2b: The impact of Regulation FD on the corporate governance-asymmetry 
relationship is more pronounced for poorly governed firms. 
4.2  Methodology 
Our main model tests the influence of corporate governance on the level of in-
formation asymmetry, controlling for firm-level variables that also affect the level of in-
formation asymmetry. 
                                                 
14 These studies include Straser (2002), Heflin et al. (2003) and Bailey et al. (2003). 
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ܫ݂݊݋ݎ݉ܽݐ݅݋݊ ܣݏݕ݉݉݁ݐݎݕ
ൌ ݂ሺܥ݋ݎ݌݋ݎܽݐ݁ ܩ݋ݒ݁ݎ݊ܽ݊ܿ݁, ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ ܸܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ, ܻ݁ܽݎሻ (3)
Our proxy for information asymmetry is PIN, and corporate governance is meas-
ured by the G index. Control variables are collected from the factors shown to have sig-
nificant impact on PIN in previous literature, including analyst following, market charac-
teristics, and institutional characteristics. Considering that PIN has a downward trend 
over time, a year dummy variable is also included. Firm level annual data is used in the 
regression. 
4.2.1 The Basic Model 
Hypothesis 1b in Section 4.1.1 is tested by the basic models in Equations 4 and 5: 
ܲܫ ௜ܰ,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ כ ܩ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ כ ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧, (4)
ܲܫ ௜ܰ,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ כ ܩ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ כ ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ ൅ ߚଷ כ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧. (5)
Equation 4 tests the simple relationship between PIN and G, while in Equation 5 
other factors affecting PIN are applied as control variables. The Ordinary Least Squares 
method is applied to the regression.  
4.2.2 Different Corporate Governance Levels 
To see whether different levels of corporate governance have different relation-
ships between PIN and G, we test separately the regressions in Equation 4 for the “High”, 
“Medium” and “Low” groups described in Chapter III. Two group dummy variables are 
applied to detect whether there exist any significant differences among the coefficients α 
and the coefficients 1 in the three independent regressions. Both dummy on intercept 
and dummy on slope are tested in Equations 6 and 7: 
ܲܫ ௜ܰ,௧ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߙଶ כ ܦଵ೔,೟ ൅ ߙଷ כ ܦଶ೔,೟ ൅ ߚଵ כ ܩ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ כ ܩ௜,௧ כ ܦଵ೔,೟ ൅ ߚଷ כ ܩ௜,௧ כ ܦଶ೔,೟
൅ ߛ כ ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧, 
(6)
ܲܫ ௜ܰ,௧ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߙଶ כ ܦଵ೔,೟ ൅ ߙଷ כ ܦଶ೔,೟ ൅ ߚଵ כ ܩ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ כ ܩ௜,௧ כ ܦଵ೔,೟ ൅ ߚଷ כ ܩ௜,௧ כ ܦଶ೔,೟
൅ ߛଵ כ ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ ൅ ߛଶ כ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧. 
(7)
The dummy variable ܦଵ equals to 1 for all firms that fall in the category of the 
“High” group, and zero otherwise. Similarly, the dummy variable ܦଶ equals to 1 for all 
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firms in the category of “Low” group, and zero otherwise. The parameters α2 and α3 test 
the difference in the intercept terms in Equation 6 and 7 between the “High” group and 
the “Medium” group and the “Low” group and the “Medium” group respectively. The 
coefficients 2 and 3 test similar differences in the slopes of G. 
4.2.3 The Effect of Regulation FD 
Using eleven years of data around Regulation FD, the approach we employ is a 
long-term event study. As argued by Agrawal et al. (2006), it takes time for financial 
analysts and firms to adjust to the regulation. Likewise, the impact of governance provi-
sions on information asymmetry could take a long time to take effect. Gompers et al. 
(2003, pg 108) claim that the ordinary short term “event-study methodology cannot iden-
tify the impact of governance provisions” and suggest a long-term approach instead. 
To see if Regulation FD alters the way corporate governance affects information 
asymmetry, we separate the data into two groups. The 5 years data before Regulation FD, 
from 1995 to 1999, is assigned to the “Before” group, and the 5 years data after Regula-
tion FD, from 2001 to 2005, is assigned to the “After” group. Separate regressions under 
Equation 4 are taken for each group to obtain separate coefficients, and a dummy variable 
is used to test if the two groups of coefficients are identical in Equations 8 and 9:  
ܲܫ ௜ܰ,௧ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߙଶ כ ܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଵ כ ܩ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ כ ܩ௜,௧ כ ܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߛ כ ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧, (8)
ܲܫ ௜ܰ,௧ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߙଶ כ ܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଵ כ ܩ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ כ ܩ௜,௧ כ ܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵ כ ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ 
൅ߛଶ כ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧. 
(9)
The dummy variable ܦ equals 1 for all the firms in the “After” group, and zero 
otherwise. The parameter α2 measures the difference on intercept before and after Regu-
lation FD, and the parameter 2 measures the difference on slope of G before and after 
the regulation. 
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CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
5.1  Empirical Evidence 
5.1.1 Initial Regressions 
In this thesis we test the joint relationship among corporate governance, voluntary 
disclosure method, and information asymmetry. Because the method of voluntary disclo-
sure is unobservable, we examine the relationship between corporate governance and in-
formation asymmetry directly. Our basic regression tests the simple relationship between 
the proxies of corporate governance and of information asymmetry, namely the G index 
and PIN. The long-term downward trend of PIN is controlled by a year variable.15 Given 
the fact that there exist many other factors affecting the market information asymmetry 
level, three sets of control variables are also considered. In the baseline regression, the 
key control variable, annual average analysts following, is included. And in the full re-
gression, a set of market characteristics variables and a set of institutional characteristics 
variables are included as well. Regression results and important parameters of the three 
regressions are presented in Table 5.1.1. 
[Insert Table 5.1.1 
Regressions Analysis of Corporate Governance and Information Asymmetry] 
The results for the basic regressions suggest that G has a negative impact on PIN, 
with a coefficient of -0.002, which means that for one unit increase in G there is 0.2% 
unit decrease in PIN. While this coefficient is statistically significant, it does not seem to 
be economically significant. The regression explains 4.7% of PIN. The negative coeffi-
cient suggests that for firms in which managers have less power, the information asym-
metry level is higher. This result contradicts Hypothesis 1b; however, one explanation for 
this could be due to a non-linear relationship between PIN and G. If G is low enough, 
there may be little or no reduction to PIN for any further decrease in G. This motivates us 
to re-examine the relationship for the High, Medium, and Low G subsamples.  
There are several other possible explanations for this result. The first explanation 
                                                 
15 Year dummies are also tested as a substitute for the year trend variable. Similar results are reported in Table 5.1.5. 
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comes from the corporate control contest hypothesis described in Chapter II. Managers in 
firms with fewer anti-takeover provisions face more risk of losing job, so they use selec-
tive disclosure to explain poor performance, and thus decrease the likelihood of job lose. 
Another explanation is the management talent signal hypothesis in Chapter II. Less pow-
erful managers face more risk of being replaced, thus they have more incentive to dis-
close through a selective channel to potential employers to distinguish themselves from 
their competitors. A third explanation involves the conflict of interest between large 
shareholders and small shareholders. As discussed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), firms 
that have a dominant (non-managing) shareholder usually have fewer pro-manager provi-
sions, so managers of such firms have less power. Furthermore, in this case large share-
holders may pressure managers to disclose information to them at the expense of minor-
ity shareholders.16  
The significance level and signs of the G coefficients do not change between the 
baseline regression and the full regression, and the adjusted R squared statistic increases 
dramatically to 0.249 with the inclusion of analysts following. 
5.1.2 Group Difference 
The corporate governance for firms with high G should have more impact on in-
formation asymmetry than the corporate governance for low G firms, because poorly 
governed firms may tend to have more private information events, while for firms with 
adequate governance, information asymmetry may not be sensitive to changes in gov-
ernance. As discussed in Chapter III, we follow Gompers et al. (2003) in constructing our 
G-based subsamples. The “High” group contains firms with G over 13; the “Low” group 
contains firms with G less than 6, and the rest are included in the “Medium” group. Table 
5.1.2 shows the regression results for each of the three groups. 
[Insert Table 5.1.2 
Group Analysis on Corporate Governance and Information Asymmetry] 
The results for the basic regressions are presented in Panel A. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, the “High” group has a positive and significant coefficient βଵ of G, and the 
coefficient of G for the “Low” group is not significantly different from zero. Also, the 
                                                 
16 However, Reza and Wilson (2007) find that Canadian family-controlled firms tend to have a lower PIN, 
which seems to contradict this theory. 
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adjusted R-squared statistic for the “High” group is higher than that for the “Low” group, 
which means that corporate governance explains more information asymmetry for more 
powerful managers firms. The above evidence suggests that for firms with strong corpo-
rate governance (low G), manager’s power may not be an important factor in the disclo-
sure method decision process (at least for small changes); while for firms with weak cor-
porate governance (high G), the power of managers is likely to be an important concern 
in determining its disclosure method. Not surprisingly because of their large proportion, 
the medium G firms are not substantially different from the full sample. 
One of the notable results in Table 5.1.2 is that the sign of the G coefficient for the 
“High” group is positive, and at over 1% per unit G, it is also economically significant, 
unlike our basic regression results for the whole population in Table 5.1.1. The positive 
sign suggests that for these weakly governed firms, information asymmetry level grows 
with the power of mangers. This finding is consistent with our theory that more powerful 
managers have greater influence on disclosure choices, thus more information is dis-
closed selectively, which leads to higher information asymmetry. Moreover, the differ-
ence in G coefficients between the “High” group and the other two groups is significant, 
while the difference between the “Low” group and the rest is not significant. The G coef-
ficient of the “High” group is significantly higher than the coefficient of the other two 
groups. It suggests that the “High” group firms behave differently from ordinary firms in 
that the impact of corporate governance on information asymmetry is significantly larger 
than the other two groups. Evidence from the baseline regression and the full regression 
reported in Panel B and Panel C further confirms this finding. The group dummies, 
measuring differences between the “High” firms and the other firms, are significant at 1% 
level and 5% level for the baseline regression and the full regression respectively. And 
the group dummies measuring the differences between the “Low” firms and the rest are 
not significant. The above finding is illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
[Insert Figure 5.1 
Analysis on Information Asymmetry by Different Governance Level] 
5.1.3 The Influence of Regulation FD 
If our theory is true, then the change of disclosure method should alter the degree 
of impact that corporate governance has on information asymmetry. As Regulation FD 
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acts on the disclosure method directly, an event study on the regulation is applied as an-
other assessment of the theory. The regression results for the event study are presented in 
Table 5.1.3. 
[Insert Table 5.1.3 
Event Study Analysis on Corporate Governance and Information Asymmetry] 
After the implementation of Regulation FD, the significance levels of the G coef-
ficient estimations do not change, but the coefficients of G decrease. Tested by an event 
dummy variable, the decrease is significant at 1% level. The above evidence suggests that 
Regulation FD significantly changes the corporate governance-information asymmetry 
relationship, which implies that firms’ disclosure method could be the channel in the rela-
tionship.  
5.1.4 Influence of Regulation FD on Different Groups 
 As discussed in Section 5.1.2, for the “High” group, corporate governance has a 
strong and significant on information asymmetry, while for the “Low” group, it shows no 
significant evidence of such a relationship. In fact, the evidence from Panel C of Table 
5.1.2 shows that while for the “High” firms, G is one of the most influential factors on 
PIN, for the “Low” firms PIN is more likely to be determined by the control variables. In 
this section, we examine whether the relationship between G and PIN for the sub-groups 
is changed with the implementation of Regulation FD. Regression results are presented in 
Table 5.1.4.  
[Insert Table 5.1.4 
Event Study Analysis on Group Differences] 
Panels A, B and C provide regression results for the High, Low and Medium 
groups respectively. In Panel A, the coefficient of G on PIN is positive and significant 
before the implementation of Regulation FD, while the coefficient after Regulation FD is 
not significant. The decrease of coefficient values, tested by an event dummy variable, is 
significant at the 1% level. In Panel B, neither of the G coefficients before or after the 
regulation is significant, and the difference is not significant either. And in Panel C, the G 
coefficient for the full regression is not significant before the regulation, but it becomes 
negative and significant later. To sum up, for all three groups, the values of G coefficients 
decrease with the implementation of Regulation FD. This evidence suggests that the im-
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pact of corporate governance on information asymmetry is reduced by the new rule on 
disclosure methods. The evidence also suggests that the impact of Regulation FD is more 
pronounced for high G firms. A possible explanation could be that before the regulation, 
powerful managers selectively disclosed information thus increased the information 
asymmetry level on the capital market. Meanwhile, less powerful managers publically 
disclosed information following the firms’ optimal disclosure policy, and had little impact 
on the level of information asymmetry. Regulation FD forces managers to publicly dis-
close all information once any selective disclosure is made. As a result, after the regula-
tion, powerful managers are less able to alter their disclosure method for personal interest, 
and thus their impact on the level of information asymmetry decreases. 
Another notable result in Table 5.1.4 is that in Panel A the coefficient of AAF is 
not significant before Regulation FD, but it becomes significant after the regulation, 
while in Panel B and Panel C both the AAF coefficients are significantly different from 
zero. This evidence suggests that analysts’ following becomes one of the main factors 
determining information asymmetry level after Regulation FD along with the decreased 
impact of corporate governance. The change suggests that Regulation FD successfully 
reforms firms’ disclosure method and it helps to reduce information asymmetry, particu-
larly for those firms with the weakest corporate governance. 
5.1.5 Discussion 
The evidence presented in the earlier sections in this chapter suggests that corpo-
rate governance is a factor influencing the level of information asymmetry in the capital 
market. One reason for this association may be because of an intermediary link with the 
method of voluntary disclosure. Although our findings are consistent with this theory in 
the sense that improvements in corporate governance could tend to reduce selective dis-
closure, particularly for those firms having the worst corporate governance, which could 
in turn tend to reduce the level of information asymmetry, they are not conclusive evi-
dence of this theory, because we lack a measure for selective (vs. public) disclosure. 
Therefore, we can only provide circumstantial evidence supporting Core’s (2001) and 
Holland’s (1998) hypotheses.  
This finding is further supported by observing the change in the relationship be-
tween corporate governance and information asymmetry following the implementation of 
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Regulation FD. If selective voluntary disclosure is the principle channel through which 
corporate governance is related to information asymmetry, then the regulation is likely to 
have the most significant effect (in terms of a reduction in the strength of this relationship) 
on those firms having the worst corporate governance. Therefore, this finding also pro-
vides circumstantial evidence for Core’s (2001) and Holland’s (1998) hypotheses. 
5.2 Robustness Checks 
Our work in this thesis is subject to various constraints. Four of the most important 
concerns are tested in this chapter as robustness checks for our hypotheses. 
5.2.1 The Distribution of PIN 
Figure 5.2 presents the density histogram of PIN. Compared to a normal distribu-
tion, the PIN data histogram is right-skewed and it has fat tail. To mitigate the impact of 
PIN’s distribution on regression results, a logistic transformation of PIN is also tested as a 
robustness check. The transformation is  
LOGPIN ൌ Log ൬ PIN1 െ PIN൰. 
(10)
As shown in Figure 5.3, the logistically transformed PIN data fits the normal distribution 
better than the original PIN data. The regression results of G on LOGPIN are presented in 
Tables 5.2.1.1, 5.2.1.2, 5.2.1.3 and 5.2.1.4. 
[Insert Figure 5.2 and 5.3, Table 5.2.1.1, 5.2.1.2, 5.2.1.3 and 5.2.1.4] 
The evidence from these regressions on LOGPIN is similar to our main regression 
results. In Table 5.2.1.1, the parameter of G is negative and significant. In Table 5.2.1.2, 
the “High” group’s G parameter is positive and significant, while the G parameter for the 
“Low” group is not significantly different from zero. The difference between the “High” 
group and the “Medium” and “Low” groups is significant except in the full regressions, 
while the difference between the “Low” group and the rest is not significant. In Table 
5.2.1.3, both the “Before” group and the “After” group have negative and significant G 
coefficients, and the difference between them is significant. In Table 5.2.1.4, the “High” 
group has a significant decrease in the G coefficient before and after Regulation FD, and 
the difference for the “Low” group is also significant. This evidence suggests that the in-
ternal relationship proved by our empirical model is robust to the distribution of the in-
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formation asymmetry proxy. 
5.2.2 The Entrenchment Index 
As discussed in Chapter IV, the G index is constructed by giving one point to the 
firm with each of the corporate governance provisions reported by the IRRC. Although 
Gompers et al. (2003) find that G is significantly associated with the net profit margin 
and return, Bebchuk et al. (2009) argue that the G index is a noisy measurement of firm 
value. Bebchuk et al. construct an entrenchment index (E) using 6 of the most discussed 
provisions: classified board, bylaw amendment limitations, charter amendment limita-
tions, supermajority, golden parachutes, and poison pill. They show that the E index is 
more relevant to stock return and firm value than the other 18 provisions. Later research-
ers, such as Masulis et al. (2007), take both G and E Index into consideration. Masulis et 
al. show that both indices are significantly related to acquisition returns.  
 The E Index is tested here as a robustness check for our empirical evidence. Ta-
bles 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2 and 5.2.2.3 list the regressions results of E on PIN. As in Table 
5.2.2.1, the association of corporate governance and information asymmetry is negative 
and significant. Table 5.2.2.3 examines the difference on E coefficient before and after 
Regulation FD. The change for both basic and baseline regressions are not significant. To 
further test the relationship between PIN and E, we group the E index data by the number 
of provisions. Firms with E lower than 2 is allocated to the “Low” group, and firms with 
E higher than 3 is allocated to the “High” group. In Table 5.2.2.2 it turns out that there is 
no significant difference on the PIN and E relation between these two groups. Also, the 
adjusted R-Squared statistics in Table 5.2.2.1 are lower than the corresponding ones in 
Table 5.1.1. One possible reason could be that the E Index does not carry as much impor-
tant information on the disclosure method, although it might contain important informa-
tion on firm value and return. It is likely that all 24 provisions are valuable determinants 
about the balance of power between shareholders and managers. 
[Insert Table 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2 and 5.2.2.3] 
5.2.3 The Unbalanced G Sample  
The IRRC follows the S&P 500 Index as well as some of the large corporations 
frequently mentioned by business journals on each report. Therefore, each IRRC report 
covers different sample firms, and the G index contains unbalanced samples. As we dis-
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cussed in Chapter III, the IRRC database grows by 24.9% in 1998 compared to the prior 
record year 1995. Such a growth causes the population mean to drop from 9.3 in 1995 to 
8.8 in 1998 by about 5%. In 2000, most of these firms were discarded from the data base 
and the mean of population climbs back to 9.0. 
To rule out the effect of an unstable sample, we test firms remaining in the G in-
dex throughout the five record years during each event window as a robustness check. We 
consider firms with unchanged CRSP permanent number to be one firm, regardless name 
changes, ticker changes, acquirers and mergers. There are 741 such firms in our sample 
set. Table 5.2.3.1 presents summary statistics of this subset.  
[Insert Table 5.2.3.1 
Summary Statistics of G for Firms Staying in IRRC] 
The sample mean and medium gradually increase from 1995 to 2005, and more 
firms move from low G to high G. The percentage of firms with G less than 6 gradually 
decreases, while the percentage of firms with G over 13 increases. This finding is differ-
ent from that in Table 3.5 which presents the summary statistics of the whole G popula-
tion. In Table 3.5, both the “Low” group and the “High” group become smaller and 
smaller as time goes by, and the moving tendency is toward the population median, while 
in Table 5.2.3.1 the trend of the samples is towards the “High” group. Another distinct 
difference is that in Table 3.5, there are more samples in the “Low” group than in the 
“High” group for the whole G population, while in Table 5.2.3.1 the number of firms in 
the “High” group outweighs the “Low” group. Such distributional differences could af-
fect the relationship between PIN and G. 
As we discussed earlier in this chapter, managers have more power on the deci-
sion of disclosure choices in high G firms. Therefore we expect to see a stronger link 
between G and PIN with the selected subsample. Regression results for this subsample 
are presented in Tables 5.2.3.2, 5.2.3.3, 5.2.3.4 and 5.2.3.5.  
[Insert Table 5.2.3.2, 5.2.3.3, 5.2.3.4 and 5.2.3.5] 
The evidence in Table 3.2 confirms the negative and significant relationship be-
tween G and PIN. The adjusted R-squared statistic is higher than the one in Table 5.1.1, 
which is consistent with our hypothesis that for high G firms, corporate governance mat-
ters more in disclosure method. Table 3.3 confirms the significant difference between the 
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“High” group and the others, and the insignificant difference between the “Low” group 
and the others. Table 3.4 confirms the significant change with the implementation of 
Regulation FD. Table 3.5 confirms our hypothesis that Regulation FD affects disclosure 
method by eliminating external factors. To sum up, our empirical evidence is not subject 
to the unbalanced sample selections. 
5.2.4 The Double Counting Trading Volume in NASDAQ Market 
The NASDAQ market is well-known for overstating trading volume. Since it is 
mostly a dealer market, many trades are double-counted, which leads to the boosting of 
trading volume. The NASDAQ trading volume is also boosted by frequent inter-dealer 
transactions in which trades occur between dealers only. As shown in Atkins and Dyl 
(1997), such activities severely boost NASDAQ trading volume by up to 50%. 
Aware of this situation, in 1998 the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) proposed the Riskless Principal Trade Reporting (RPTR) Rule, which was im-
plemented in February 2001. The Rules intend to prevent dealers from actual trades in 
matching asks and bids, thus protect dealers from potential loss, and eliminate the dou-
ble-counting. These rules, along with the emerging of Electronic Communication Net-
work (ECN) trading, help to reduce the degree of overstating trading volume in 
NASDAQ market. As tested in Anderson and Dyl (2005), the median of NASDAQ trad-
ing volume dropped by 38% since RPTR. By 2006, about 75% of NASDAQ trades are 
through ECN. (Anderson and Dyl, 2007). 
The double-counting trading volume can affect our research in three ways: (1) the 
analysis of PIN during Regulation FD, as the implementation of RPTR is in the same pe-
riod; (2) trading volume as a control variable when analyzing PIN on G, since we con-
sider trading volume as a combination of NYSE and NASDAQ markets; and (3) PIN it-
self is sensitive to volume since it is constructed based on the estimated buyer and seller 
arrival rates. 
 To rule out the effect of the double counting problem, we test a sample set of 
only NYSE firms as a robustness check. Separate summary statistics of PIN and G on the 
NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX markets are presented in Table 5.2.4.1. 
[Insert Table 5.2.4.1 
Summary Statistics of PIN and G on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX] 
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As shown in Table 5.2.4.1., the 12,654 observations in NYSE market have a 
higher mean G index (9.571 compared to 8.178 and 8.346) and a lower mean of PIN 
(0.143 compared to 0.193 and 0.175) than the 8,513 observations on the other two mar-
kets. As in Section 5.2.3, we hypothesize that NYSE having a high G will have a strong 
relationship between PIN and G. This hypothesis is confirmed in Table 5.2.4.2. The coef-
ficient of G is negative and significant, and the adjusted R-squared statistic is 360 percent 
higher than that in Table 5.1.1 for the whole population. The change from Regulation FD 
is presented in Table 5.2.4.3. The regulation has a significant impact on NYSE stocks. 
The group difference from Regulation FD is presented in Tables 5.2.4.4 and 5.2.4.5, with 
the same findings as our main regression results in Section 5.1. 
[Insert Table 5.2.4.2, 5.2.4.3, 5.2.4.4 and 5.2.4.5] 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Voluntary disclosure is a channel through which corporate information is passed 
on to the capital market. The decision to voluntarily disclose information is determined 
by corporate controllers. Moreover, corporate controllers also determine whether volun-
tarily disclosing information will be done through public or selective means. Therefore, 
the balance of power between managers and shareholders and the level of managerial en-
trenchment could have a substantial effect on not only what information is disclosed, but 
also how it is disclosed. For example, a powerful manager may experience fewer restric-
tions in the use of selective, rather than public, information disclosure, and such manag-
ers are likely to disclose in a self-serving manner. Managers with a moderate level power 
may use selective disclosure to avoid job loss. The role of disclosure method as the con-
nection between corporate governance and information asymmetry is consistent with the 
results of our event study on Regulation FD. The regulation seems to successfully alter 
firms’ disclosure method, and reduces the strong impact of governance changes on in-
formation asymmetry for weakly governed firms. 
Our research is subject to several of limitations. First, we do not test the causality 
of corporate governance and information asymmetry level. We cannot rule out the possi-
bility that asymmetric information in the capital market can inversely affect the approval 
of new governance provisions or the submission of opposing resolutions. Second, the 
original source of the G data and the block holder data is the IRRC, which covers only 
S&P 500 and other large firms. Therefore, it is possible that our data set excludes small 
firms and experiences a large firm bias. Thus caution is needed when extrapolating the 
conclusions to small firms. 
There remain several untested questions in this thesis. First, different effects from 
the components of the corporate governance index on disclosure method and information 
asymmetry can be further examined, and other proxies for corporate governance can be 
tested. Second, other market characteristics associated with disclosure methods, such as 
bid-ask spread, information credibility and analysts forecast accuracy, can be tested. In-
dustrial differences may also affect the relationship. We leave these questions for future 
research. 
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Table 3.1 
PIN Data Distribution by Every 0.1 
This table decomposes the value of PIN into 10 categories by every 0.1. The sample consists of 
398,756 quarterly PIN estimations between the first quarter of 1993 and the second quarter of 2006 for 
firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. A detailed definition of PIN is in Section 3.1.1. 
Range by 
0.1 
Frequency Percentage 
Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
0.0-0.1 28,946  7.26 28,946  7.26 
0.1-0.2 144,319  36.19 173,265  43.45 
0.2-0.3 132,550  33.24 305,815  76.69 
0.3-0.4 55,674  13.96 361,489  90.65 
0.4-0.5 17,648  4.43 379,137  95.08 
0.5-0.6 7,744  1.94 386,881  97.02 
0.6-0.7 4,788  1.20 391,669  98.22 
0.7-0.8 3,093  0.78 394,762  99.00 
0.8-0.9 1,793  0.45 396,555  99.45 
0.9-1.0 2,201  0.55 398,756  100.00 
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Table 3.2 
0.90-1.00 PIN Data Distribution by Every 0.01 
This table decomposes the subgroup of PIN from 0.90 to 1.00 into 10 categories by every 0.01.The 
sample consists of 2,201 quarterly PIN estimations valued between 0.90 and 1.00 from the first quar-
ter of 1993 to the second quarter of 2006 for firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. A detailed 
definition of PIN is in Section 3.1.1. 
Range by 0.01 Frequency Percentage 
Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
0.90-0.91 99 4.50 99 4.50 
0.91-0.92 69 3.13 168 7.63 
0.92-0.93 80 3.63 248 11.27 
0.93-0.94 58 2.64 306 13.90 
0.94-0.95 31 1.41 337 15.31 
0.95-0.96 29 1.32 366 16.63 
0.96-0.97 17 0.77 383 17.40 
0.97-0.98 9 0.41 392 17.81 
0.98-0.99 4 0.18 396 17.99 
0.99-1.00 1,805 82.01 2,201 100.00 
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Table 3.3 
0.00-0.10 PIN Data Distribution by Every 0.01 
This table decomposes the subgroup of PIN from 0.00 to 0.10 into 10 categories by every 0.01.The 
sample consists of 28,960 quarterly PIN estimations valued between 0.00 and 0.01 from the first 
quarter of 1993 to the second quarter of 2006 for firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. A de-
tailed definition of PIN is in Section 3.1.1. 
Range by 0.01 Frequency Percentage 
Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
0.00-0.01 1,779 6.14 1,779 6.14 
0.01-0.02 279 0.96 2,058 7.11 
0.02-0.03 424 1.46 2,482 8.57 
0.03-0.04 605 2.09 3,087 10.66 
0.04-0.05 986 3.40 4,073 14.06 
0.05-0.06 1,756 6.06 5,829 20.13 
0.06-0.07 3,055 10.55 8,884 30.68 
0.07-0.08 4,863 16.79 13,747 47.47 
0.08-0.09 6,686 23.09 20,433 70.56 
0.09-0.10 8,527 29.44 28,960 100.00 
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Table 3.4 
IRRC Corporate Governance Provisions 
Provisions Contents 
Delay 
Blank Check Preferred stocks that the board determines holders’ rights. 
Classified Board Directors are in different classes serving overlapping terms. 
Special Meeting  Require majority shareholder support for a special meeting. 
Written Consent Limitations on action by Written Consent. 
Protection 
Compensation Plans Extra compensations under change in control. 
Indemnification Contracts Contracts indemnifying managers from lawsuit expenses. 
Golden Parachutes Compensation to senior executives under change in control. 
Director Indemnification Bylaws/charter indemnifying managers from lawsuit expenses. 
Limitations on Liability Charter amendments that limit directors’ personal liability. 
Severance Agreements Positions/compensation not contingent under change in control. 
Voting 
Bylaw Amendment  Limit shareholders’ ability to amend the governing documents. 
Charter Amendment  Limit shareholders’ ability to amend the governing documents. 
Cumulative Voting (+) Allows a shareholder to allocate total votes in any manner. 
Secret Ballot (+) Independent third party sworn to secrecy count proxy votes. 
Supermajority* Higher votes for combinations than threshold requirements. 
Unequal Voting Limit voting rights of some shareholders and expand others. 
Other 
Antigreenmail* Prevent shareholder selling at premium for not seeking control. 
Directors’ Duties* Considering constituencies besides shareholders in a merger. 
Fair Price* Limit the range of prices a bidder can pay in two-tier offers. 
Pension Parachutes Prevent using pension fund of object to finance acquisition. 
Poison Pill Provide holders with special rights in a triggering event 
Silver Parachutes More employees are eligible for golden parachutes benefits. 
State 
Antigreenmail law* Prevent shareholder selling at premium for not seeking control. 
Business Combination Law Pause certain transactions approved by Board of Directors 
Cash-out Law Sales to control shareholder at highest recent acquired price 
Directors’ Duties Law* Considering constituencies besides shareholders in a merger. 
Fair price Law* Limit the range of prices a bidder can pay in two-tier offers 
Control Share Acquisition Law* Higher votes for combinations than threshold requirements. 
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Table 3.5 
Summary Statistics of G by Reporting Year 
This table provides summary statistics of G, the Governance Index over time. The sample consists of 
14,000 annual G data from 1990 to 2006 for firms covered by the IRRC Corporate Takeover Defences 
(Rosenbaum 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006). Firms are allocated into 3 groups fol-
lowing Gompers et al. (2003). The Low group is composed of firms with G ≤ 5, and the High group is 
composed of firms with G ≥ 14. The rest are in the Medium group. A detailed definition of G is in Section 
3.1.2. 
 1990 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Total 
Governance Index         
Minimum 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 
Maximum 17.0 17.0 17.0 18.0 19.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 19.0 
Mean 8.9 9.2 9.3 8.8 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 
Median 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 
Mode 10.0 9.0 9.0 10.0 9.0 8.0 8.0 9.0 9.0 
Std Dev 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.7 
Number of Firms         
G ≤ 5 (Low) 183  170  145 267 185 167 169  140  1,426 
G = 6 144  106  125 199 192 163 154  159  1,242 
G = 7 171  158  146 213 221 222 215  223  1,569 
G = 8 173  154  172 233 229 276 317  283  1,837 
G = 9 170  196  194 212 255 254 282  315  1,878 
G = 10 186  176  185 238 251 271 281  247  1,835 
G = 11 158  176  173 203 208 218 230  224  1,590 
G = 12 106  129  150 145 150 128 155  146  1,109 
G = 13 89 103  114 117 109 101 95  85  813 
G ≥14(High) 87 95  92 87 87 94 85  74  701 
Total 1,467  1,463  1,496 1,914 1,887 1,894 1,983  1,896  14,000 
% of Low 12.5% 11.6% 9.7% 13.9% 9.8% 8.8% 8.5% 7.4% 10.2%
% of High 5.9% 6.5% 6.1% 4.5% 4.6% 5.0% 4.3% 3.9% 5.0% 
% of G = 9 11.6% 13.4% 13.0% 11.1% 13.5% 13.4% 14.2% 16.6% 13.4%
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Table 3.6 
Definitions of Regression Variables 
Variable Definition 
PIN Probability of Information-based Trading 
G The Corporate Governance Index 
AAF Annual Average Analysts Following 
Capitalization Year-end market capitalization 
Volume Annual Average trading volume 
Book-to-Market Year-end book-to-market ratio 
Block Percentage of shares held by all block holders 
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Table 3.7 
Summary Statistics of Regression Variables 
Variable N Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Sum Minimum Maximum 
PIN 5,285 0.139 0.055 736.453 0.013  0.703 
G 5,285 9.503 2.723 50,223 2.000  18.000 
AAF 5,285 10.007 6.940 52,888 1.000  39.417 
Capitalization 5,285 7,949,178 23,522,136 42,011,400,000 8,178  507,216,640 
Volume 5,285 195,777 439,534 1,034,681,829 297  13,188,100 
Book-to-Market 5,285 0.389 0.377 2,057 0.000  10.979 
Block 5,285 23.034 17.221 121,735 0.000  92.600 
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Table 3.8 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Regression Variables 
The sample contains 5,285 observations during 1995 and 2005. Pearson correlation coefficients be-
tween regression variables are provided.  
PIN G AAF Cap Vol BM Block 
PIN 1.000 -0.108 -0.447 -0.263 -0.248 0.171 0.273
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
G  1.000 -0.011 -0.057 -0.062 0.006 -0.251
 (0.443) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.643) (<0.001)
AAF  1.000 0.422 0.481 -0.223 -0.291
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Capitalization  1.000 0.522 -0.163 -0.199
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Volume  1.000 -0.080 -0.173
 (<0.001) (<0.001)
Book-to-Market  1.000 0.118
  (<0.001)
Block   1.000
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Table 3.9 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Regression Variables on Regulation FD 
The sample contains 4,733 observations during 1995 and 2005. The years 1995 to 1999 are recognized 
as before Regulation FD, and 2001 to 2005 are recognized as after the regulation. The year 2000 is 
excluded from the analysis. Panel A provides Pearson correlation coefficients between regression 
variables. Panel B provides a comparison of correlation coefficients. P-values are shown in parenthe-
ses. A detailed description is in Section 3.2.2. 
PIN G AAF Cap Vol BM Block 
Panel A: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
After 
PIN 1.000 -0.123 -0.478 -0.310 -0.247 0.209 0.293
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
G  1.000 -0.048 -0.047 -0.069 0.000 -0.235
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.000) (0.986) (<0.001)
AAF  1.000 0.424 0.512 -0.245 -0.271
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Capitalization  1.000 0.641 -0.178 -0.215
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Volume  1.000 -0.102 -0.199
 (<0.001) (<0.001)
Book-to-Market  1.000 0.080
  (<0.001)
Block   1.000
Before 
PIN 1.000 -0.059 -0.439 -0.255 -0.246 0.234 0.279
 (0.008) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
G  1 0.029 -0.06 -0.107 -0.033 -0.286
 (0.195) (0.007) (<0.001) (0.133) (<0.001)
AAF  1 0.445 0.572 -0.248 -0.312
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Capitalization  1 0.578 -0.185 -0.186
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Volume  1 -0.191 -0.193
 (<0.001) (<0.001)
Book-to-Marke  1 0.144
 (<0.001)
Block   1.000
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PIN G AAF Cap Vol BM Block 
Panel B: Comparison of Correlation Coefficients Before and After Regulation FD 
Difference ܪ଴: ρଵ ൌ ρଶ 
PIN 0 2.104 1.651 2.023 0.012 6.410 -0.362
 (0.035) (0.099) (0.043) (0.990) (0.000) (0.717)
G  0 2.644 -0.386 -1.308 -0.663 -1.875
 (0.008) (0.699) (0.191) (0.507) (0.061)
AAF  0 0.884 2.948 -5.351 -1.545
 (0.377) (0.003) (0.000) (0.122)
Capitalization  0 -2.936 -3.622 1.042
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.297)
Volume  0 -4.888 0.099
 (0.000) (0.921)
Book-to-Market  0 3.665
  (0.000)
Block   0
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Table 5.1.1 
Regressions Analysis of Corporate Governance and Information Asymmetry 
This table provides regression results for the whole population. The sample consists of 5,285 observa-
tions between 1995 and 2005. The dependent variable is PIN. In Basic Regression only G and year are 
included. In Baseline Regression AFF is also considered. In Full Regression all other control variables 
are considered as well. Variable definitions are in Table 3.6. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
***and ** indicates significance at 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) 
Basic Regression Baseline Regression Full Regression
G -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001***
(-6.886) (-8.140) (-4.890)
AAF -0.004*** -0.003***
(-37.688) (-25.734)
Capitalization 0.000***
(-6.305)
Volume 0.000**
(2.503)
Book-to-Market 0.013***
(7.633)
Block 0.000***
(11.671)
Year -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(-14.105) (-16.045) (-18.748)
Intercept 0.179*** 0.216*** 0.191***
(59.826) (76.207) (57.520)
Adjusted R Square 0.047 0.249 0.285
Degree of Freedom 5282 5281 5277
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Table 5.1.2 
Group Analysis on Corporate Governance and Information Asymmetry 
This table provides regression results for the High, Low, and Medium groups respectively. The sample 
period is between 1995 and 2005. The dependent variable is PIN. Variable definitions are in Table 3.6. 
Column (4) provides statistics of the difference between coefficients of the High group and the other 
two groups, and Column (5) provides statistics of the difference between the Low group and the other 
two groups. The differences are tested with a High group dummy variable and a Low group dummy 
variable respectively. Panel A, Panel B and Panel C provide the regression results for Basic Regres-
sion, Baseline Regression and Full Regression correspondingly. T-statistics are presented in parenthe-
ses, with ***, ** and * indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable High Low Medium 
High- 
(Low+Medium) 
Low- 
(High+Medium)
Panel A: Basic Regression 
G 0.011*** -0.003 -0.002*** 0.013*** -0.001
 (3.756) (-0.591) (-3.985) (3.730) (-0.318)
Year -0.004*** -0.002 -0.003***  
 (-4.608) (-1.612) (-13.340)  
Intercept -0.006 0.182*** 0.175*** -0.184*** 0.017
 (-0.145) (8.837) (43.473) (-3.656) (1.002)
Adjusted R Square 0.094 0.007 0.042  
Degree of Freedom 343 409 4524  
Panel B: Baseline Regression 
G 0.007** 0.001 -0.002*** 0.008*** 0.003
 (2.467) (0.240) (-6.071) (2.691) (0.862)
AAF -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004***  
 (-7.177) (-8.923) (-35.915)  
Year -0.004*** -0.001 -0.004***  
 (-5.489) (-1.172) (-15.473)  
Intercept 0.087** 0.195*** 0.216*** -0.115*** -0.007
 (1.997) (10.300) (57.964) (-2.562) (-0.493)
Adjusted R Square 0.213 0.169 0.254  
Degree of Freedom 342 408 4523  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable High Low Medium 
High- 
(Low+Medium) 
Low- 
(High+Medium)
Panel C: Full Regression 
G 0.007** 0.002 -0.001*** 0.008** 0.002
(2.314) (0.587) (-3.364) (2.505) (0.638)
AAF -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003***  
(-4.118) (-5.205) (-24.784)  
Capitalization 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000***  
(-3.105) (-2.510) (-5.861)  
Volume 0.000 0.000** 0.000**  
(0.865) (2.232) (2.223)  
Book-to-Market -0.002 0.042*** 0.012***  
(-0.266) (5.776) (6.376)  
Block 0.000** 0.001*** 0.000***  
 (2.058) (4.189) (9.936)  
Year -0.004*** -0.002** -0.004***  
 (-5.245) (-2.425) (-17.840)  
Intercept 0.085* 0.151*** 0.192*** -0.108** -0.005
 (1.952) (8.056) (45.312) (-2.467) (-0.309)
Adjusted R Square 0.251 0.279 0.286  
Degree of Freedom 338 404 4519  
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Table 5.1.3 
Event Study Analysis on Corporate Governance and Information Asymmetry 
This table provides regression results for the event study analysis on Regulation FD. The years 1995 to 1999 are recognized as before Regulation FD, and 2001 to 2005 
are after. The year 2000 is excluded from the analysis. The dependent variable is PIN. Columns (3), (6) and (9) are statistics of the differences on coefficients before and 
after the regulation tested with a dummy variable using a t-test. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *** and * indicates significance at 0.01 and 0.1 level respec-
tively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Basic Regression Baseline Regression  Full Regression 
After Before After-Before After Before After-Before  After Before After-Before
G -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002***
 (-6.285) (-3.495) (-2.228) (-8.662) (-3.288) (-3.965) (-6.539) (-0.198) (-3.902)
AAF  -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
  (-28.992) (-23.366) (-20.339) (-16.047)
Capitalization   0.000*** 0.000**
   (-7.285) (-2.475)
Volume   0.000*** 0.000***
   (3.873) (3.716)
Book-to-Market   0.013*** 0.028***
   (4.638) (9.089)
Block   0.000*** 0.001***
  (7.676) (8.751)
Year -0.002*** -0.010*** -0.001 -0.010*** -0.001* -0.012***
(-2.652) (-13.141) (-1.628) (-15.246) (-1.827) (-17.858)
Intercept 0.176*** 0.195*** 0.026*** 0.211*** 0.225*** 0.030*** 0.183*** 0.195*** 0.027***
(22.509) (43.255) (4.141) (30.525) (53.616) (5.471) (24.624) (40.793) (5.038)
Adjusted R Square 0.018 0.082 0.25 0.278 0.291 0.338
Degree of Freedom 2711 2016 2710 2015 2706 2011
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Table 5.1.4 
Event Study Analysis on Group Differences 
This table provides regression results for event study analysis on Regulation FD by groups. The dependent variable is PIN. Panel A, B and C provide regression results 
for the High group, the Low group and the Medium group, respectively. Column (3), (6) and (9) are statistics of the differences on coefficients before and after the 
regulation tested with a event dummy variable. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Basic Regression Baseline Regression Full Regression 
 After Before After-Before After Before After-Before After Before After-Before 
Panel A: High 
G -0.002 0.030*** -0.031*** -0.002 0.028*** -0.023*** -0.003 0.027*** -0.023***
 (-0.449) (6.279) (-5.025) (-0.663) (5.235) (-3.783) (-0.842) (5.156) (-3.852)
AAF  -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.001
  (-7.408) (-0.771) (-3.799) (-0.835)
Capitalization   0.000** 0.000
   (-2.425) (-1.021)
Volume   0.000 0.000**
   (-0.576) (2.337)
Book-to-Market   0.009 0.005
   (0.894) (0.308)
Block   0.000 0.001***
   (-0.043) (3.621)
Year -0.003 -0.009*** -0.002 -0.008*** -0.001 -0.009***
 (-1.191) (-2.844) (-1.017) (-2.826) (-0.587) (-3.003)
Intercept 0.178*** -0.261*** 0.465*** 0.217*** -0.228*** 0.342*** 0.212*** -0.230*** 0.339***
 (2.865) (-3.735) (5.078) (3.934) (-2.780) (3.787) (3.797) (-2.886) (3.802)
Adjusted R Square 0.009 0.283 0.229 0.287 0.280 0.395
Degree of Freedom 193 117 192 116 188 112
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Basic Regression Baseline Regression Full Regression 
 After Before After-Before After Before After-Before After Before After-Before 
Panel B: Low 
G 0.005 -0.008 0.014 0.008 -0.006 0.018** 0.007 -0.005 0.013
 (0.723) (-1.347) (1.487) (1.11) (-1.291) (2.110) (0.977) (-1.178) (1.626)
AAF  -0.002** -0.005*** -0.002** -0.003***
  (-2.522) (-10.322) (-2.247) (-4.879)
Capitalization   0.000*** 0.000
   (-2.798) (1.295)
Volume   0.000** 0.000**
  (2.555) (-2.473)
Book-to-Market   0.031* 0.047***
   (1.771) (5.974)
Block   0.000 0.001***
   (1.652) (3.682)
Year 0 -0.005* 0 -0.005** 0.001 -0.005***
 (-0.028) (-1.673) (0.031) (-2.209) (0.254) (-2.654)
Intercept 0.135*** 0.216*** -0.054 0.139*** 0.25*** -0.068* 0.106** 0.197*** -0.052
 (2.929) (7.628) (-1.249) (3.073) (10.641) (-1.727) (2.328) (8.729) (-1.386)
Adjusted R Square 0.004 0.020 0.047 0.342 0.149 0.492
Degree of Freedom 141 219 140 218 136 214
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Basic Regression Baseline Regression Full Regression 
 After Before After-Before After Before After-Before After Before After-Before 
Panel C: Medium 
G -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002** -0.003*** -0.001* -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002***
 (-4.334) (-1.193) (-2.196) (-6.952) (-1.814) (-3.419) (-4.607) (0.19) (-3.184)
AAF  -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
  (-28.914) (-20.967) (-19.988) (-15.673)
Capitalization   0.000*** 0.000***
   (-6.8) (-3.315)
Volume   0.000*** 0.000***
   (3.727) (5.027)
Book-to-Market   0.013*** 0.025***
   (4.442) (7.48)
Block   0.000*** 0.000***
   (7.399) (6.39)
Year -0.002** -0.011*** -0.001 -0.011*** -0.001* -0.013***
 (-2.493) (-13.664) (-1.504) (-15.804) (-1.726) (-18.02)
Intercept 0.173*** 0.189*** 0.033*** 0.214*** 0.223*** 0.036*** 0.182*** 0.198*** 0.033***
 (19.115) (32.302) (4.001) (27.048) (40.845) (4.962) (21.352) (33.03) (4.598)
Adjusted R Square 0.011 0.100 0.269 0.288 0.310 0.339
Degree of Freedom 2371 1674 2370 1673 2366 1669
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Table 5.1.5 
Regressions Analysis Using Year Dummies 
This table provides regression results for the whole population of 5,285 observations. The dependent variable is PIN. 
Year dummies are used instead of a year trend variable. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **and * indicates 
significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Basic Regression Baseline Regression Full Regression 
G -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001***
(-7.458) (-8.855) (-5.440)
AAF -0.004*** -0.003***
(-38.718) (-26.635)
Capitalization 0.000***
(-5.695)
Volume 0.000***
(2.785)
Book-to-Market 0.015***
(8.723)
Block 0.000***
 (12.169)
Dummy1995 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.051***
 (12.172) (13.925) (15.834)
Dummy1996 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.044***
 (10.763) (11.795) (13.815)
Dummy1997 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.019***
 (4.272) (4.011) (6.078)
Dummy1998 0.009 0.003 0.008***
 (2.576) (1.132) (2.795)
Dummy1999 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.011***
 (2.668) (3.021) (3.889)
Dummy2000 0.005* 0.005* 0.006**
 (1.680) (1.812) (2.048)
Dummy2001 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.010***
 (3.457) (2.953) (3.540)
Dummy2002 0.003 -0.002 -0.003
 (0.801) (-0.565) (-1.180)
Dummy2003 0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.566) (-0.672) (-0.386)
Dummy2004 0.004 0.002 0.003
 (1.170) (0.746) (1.027)
Intercept(2005) 0.148*** 0.187*** 0.154***
 (42.258) (57.503) (40.530)
Adjusted R Square 0.066 0.273 0.311
Degree of Freedom 5273 5272 5268
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Table 5.2.1.1 
Regression Analysis on LOGPIN 
This table provides regression results for a sample consisting of 5,285 observations between 1995 and 
2005. The dependent variable is LOGPIN. In Basic Regression only G and year are included. In Base-
line Regression AFF is also considered. In Full Regression all other control variables are considered as 
well. Variable definitions are in Section 3.1.1 and Table 3.6. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
*** indicates significance at 0.01 level. 
(1) (2) (3) 
Basic Regression Baseline Regression Full Regression 
G -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.009***
(-5.924) (-7.442) (-4.580)
AAF -0.033*** -0.025***
(-45.308) (-29.264)
Capitalization 0.000***
(-9.311)
Volume 0.000
(-1.054)
Book-to-Market 0.105***
(7.872)
Block 0.004***
(12.348)
Year -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.038***
(-17.494) (-20.803) (-23.125)
Intercept -1.545*** -1.209*** -1.419***
(-64.275) (-55.701) (-56.394)
Adjusted R Square 0.064 0.326 0.372
Degree of Freedom 5282 5281 5277
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Table 5.2.1.2  
Group Analysis on LOGPIN 
This table provides regression results for the High, Low and Medium groups respectively. The sample 
period is between 1995 and 2005. The dependent variable is LOGPIN. Variable definitions are in Sec-
tion 3.1.1 and Table 3.6. Column (4) provides statistics of the difference between coefficients of the 
High group and the other two groups, and Column (5) provides statistics of the difference between the 
Low group and the others. The differences are tested with group dummy variables. Panels A, B and C 
provide the regression results for Basic, Baseline, and Full regressions correspondingly. T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses, with ***, ** and * indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable High Low Medium 
High- 
(Low+Medium) 
Low- 
(High+Medium)
Panel A: Basic Regression 
G 0.077*** -0.026 -0.010*** 0.088*** -0.017
 (3.262) (-0.812) (-3.368) (3.172) (-0.574)
Year -0.036*** -0.018** -0.035***  
 (-5.635) (-2.223) (-16.491)  
Intercept -2.809*** -1.509*** -1.575*** -1.245*** 0.163
 (-8.027) (-9.871) (-48.270) (-3.087) (1.206)
Adjusted R Square 0.111 0.013 0.060  
Degree of Freedom 343 409 4524  
Panel B: Baseline Regression 
G 0.037* 0.004 -0.015*** 0.045* 0.020
 (1.682) (0.130) (-5.868) (1.920) (0.793)
AAF -0.028*** -0.030*** -0.033***  
 (-9.147) (-10.520) (-43.144)  
Year -0.040*** -0.013* -0.036***  
 (-6.983) (-1.810) (-20.013)  
Intercept -1.909*** -1.400*** -1.190*** -0.606* -0.061
 (-5.800) (-10.283) (-41.204) (-1.767) (-0.532)
Adjusted R Square 0.286 0.224 0.334  
Degree of Freedom 342 408 4523  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable High Low Medium 
High- 
(Low+Medium) 
Low- 
(High+Medium)
Panel C: Full Regression 
G 0.032 0.009 -0.009*** 0.041* 0.013
 (1.492) (0.337) (-3.362) (1.789) (0.559)
AAF -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.025***  
 (-4.875) (-5.173) (-28.207)  
Capitalization 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  
 (-3.755) (-3.206) (-8.747)  
Volume 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.112) (0.557) (-0.931)  
Book-to-Market -0.001 0.277*** 0.096***  
 (-0.014) (5.369) (6.823)  
Block 0.002* 0.004*** 0.004***  
 (1.899) (4.541) (10.567)  
Year -0.039*** -0.020*** -0.039***  
 (-6.466) (-2.887) (-22.100)  
Intercept -1.930*** -1.725*** -1.400*** -0.576* -0.0386
 (-5.939) (-12.902) (-43.210) (-1.735) (-0.340)
Adjusted R Square 0.334 0.333 0.376  
Degree of Freedom 338 404 4519  
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Table 5.2.1.3 
Event Study Analysis on LOGPIN 
This table provides regression results for event study analysis of LOGPIN on Regulation FD. The years 1995 to 1999 are recognized as before Regulation FD and 2001 
to 2005 are recognized as after. The year 2000 is excluded from the analysis. The dependent variable is PIN. Columns (3), (6) and (9) have statistics of the differences on 
coefficients during the regulation tested with a dummy variable. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *** and ** indicates significance at 0.01 and 0.05 level 
rrespectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Basic Regression Baseline Regression Full Regression 
 After Before After-Before After Before After-Before After Before After-Before 
G -0.019*** -0.008*** -0.010** -0.024*** -0.007*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.001 -0.016***
 (-5.473) (-2.955) (-2.272) (-8.349) (-2.699) (-4.405) (-6.324) (-0.249) (-4.305)
AAF  -0.038*** -0.027*** -0.030*** -0.020***
 (-34.804) (-27.547) (-23.583) (-16.716)
Capitalization   0.000*** 0.000***
   (-10.562) (-3.864)
Volume   0.000*** 0.000
   (3.135) (0.154)
Book-to-Market   0.103*** 0.199***
   (4.614) (9.057)
Block   0.004*** 0.004***
   (8.405) (8.906)
Year -0.030*** -0.079*** -0.021*** -0.082*** -0.022*** -0.090***
 (-4.665) (-13.912) (-3.919) (-16.833) (-4.405) (-19.075)
Intercept -1.512*** -1.448*** 0.217*** -1.170*** -1.186*** 0.257*** -1.402*** -1.415*** 0.235***
 (-23.231) (-42.788) (4.292) (-21.271) (-39.042) (6.008) (-24.089) (-41.222) (5.671)
Adjusted R Square 0.020 0.090 0.323 0.339 0.380 0.400
Degree of Freedom 2711 2016 2710 2015 2706 2011
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Table 5.2.1.4 
Event Study Analysis on Group Differences for LOGPIN 
This table provides regression results for event study analysis on Regulation FD by groups. The dependent variable is LOGPIN. Panels A and B provides regression re-
sults for the High and Low groups respectively. Columns (3), (6) and (9) have statistics of the differences in coefficients before and after the regulation tested with a 
dummy variable. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Basic Regression Baseline Regression Full Regression 
 After Before After-Before After Before After-Before After Before After-Before 
Panel A: High 
G -0.011 0.201*** -0.209*** -0.016 0.171*** -0.125*** -0.020 0.164*** -0.130***
 (-0.303) (6.362) (-4.270) (-0.542) (4.875) (-2.700) (-0.678) (4.851) (-2.863)
AAF  -0.039*** -0.009* -0.026*** -0.006
 (-8.758) (-1.882) (-4.745) (-0.960)
Capitalization   0.000*** 0.000
   (-3.191) (-1.31)
Volume   0.000 0.000
   (-0.208) (1.423)
Book-to-Market   0.072 0.079
   (0.844) (0.749)
Block   0.000 0.007***
   (-0.186) (3.760)
Year -0.043** -0.079*** -0.036** -0.079*** -0.028 -0.080***
 (-2.120) (-3.971) (-2.110) (-3.984) (-1.634) (-4.017)
Intercept -1.447*** -4.493*** 3.214*** -1.066** -3.964*** 1.931*** -1.140** -4.061*** 1.964***
 (-2.706) (-9.648) (4.443) (-2.341) (-7.343) (2.817) (-2.507) (-7.734) (2.924)
Adjusted R Square 0.023 0.317 0.302 0.338 0.364 0.440
Degree of Freedom 193 117 192 116 188 112
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Basic Regression Baseline Regression Full Regression 
 After Before After-Before After Before After-Before After Before After-Before 
Panel B: Low 
G 0.045 -0.067 0.116* 0.076 -0.054 0.150** 0.063 -0.05* 0.118**
 (0.797) (-1.575) (1.692) (1.392) (-1.594) (2.475) (1.220) (-1.654) (2.078)
AAF -0.021*** -0.036*** -0.016** -0.021***
 (-3.753) (-11.242) (-2.114) (-5.265)
Capitalization  0.000*** 0.000
  (-3.750) (1.222)
Volume  0.000 0.000***
 (1.522) (-3.283)
Book-to-Market  0.220* 0.298***
  (1.746) (5.356)
Block  0.003* 0.004***
  (1.897) (3.646)
Year -0.007 -0.044** -0.005 -0.047*** -0.005 -0.048***
 (-0.236) (-2.138) (-0.160) (-2.869) (-0.181) (-3.254)
Intercept -1.898*** -1.235*** -0.442 -1.853*** -0.973*** -0.561** -2.054*** -1.320*** -0.445*
 (-5.539) (-5.981) (-1.383) (-5.650) (-5.851) (-1.983) (-6.323) (-8.210) (-1.676)
Adjusted R Square 0.005 0.031 0.096 0.386 0.226 0.522
Degree of Freedom 141 219 140 218 136 214
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Table 5.2.2.1 
Regression Analysis on PIN with E Index 
This table provides regression results for a sample consisting of 5,099 observations between 1995 and 
2005. The dependent variable is PIN. In Basic Regression only E Index and year are included. In 
Baseline Regression AFF is also considered. In Full Regression all other control variables are consi-
dered as well. Variable definitions are in Section 5.2.2 and Table 3.6. T-statistics are presented in pa-
rentheses. *** and ** indicates significance at 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) 
Basic Regression Baseline Regression Full Regression 
E  -0.001 -0.002*** -0.001**
(-1.227) (-4.761) (-2.399)
AAF -0.004*** -0.003***
(-37.921) (-25.828)
Capitalization 0.000***
(-6.499)
Volume 0.000**
(2.414)
Book-to-Market 0.013***
(7.759)
Block 0.001***
(12.727)
Year -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(-14.497) (-15.957) (-18.772)
Intercept 0.164*** 0.203*** 0.181***
(78.671) (95.843) (71.110)
Adjusted R Square 0.040 0.243 0.284
Degree of Freedom 5354 5353 5349
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Table 5.2.2.2 
Group Analysis on PIN with E Index 
This table provides regression results for the High, Low, and Medium groups respectively. The sample 
period is between 1995 and 2005. The dependent variable is PIN. Variable definitions are in Section 
5.2.2 and Table 3.6. Column (4) provides statistics of the difference between coefficients of the High 
group and the other two groups, and Column (5) provides statistics of the difference between the Low 
group and the other two groups. The differences are tested with group dummy variables. Panels A, B 
and C provide the regression results for the Basic, Baseline, and Full regressions correspondingly. 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses, with *** indicates significance at 0.01 level. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable High Low Medium 
High- 
(Low+Medium) 
Low- 
(High+Medium)
Panel A: Basic Regression 
E  -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000
 (-0.289) (0.277) (0.504) (-0.468) (-0.106)
Year -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003***  
 (-7.756) (-6.770) (-10.329)  
Intercept 0.165*** 0.166*** 0.158*** 0.007 0.006
 (11.748) (40.161) (28.810) (0.422) (0.958)
Adjusted R Square 0.046 0.034 0.037  
Degree of Freedom 1251 1310 2787  
Panel B: Baseline Regression 
E -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 -0.001
 (-0.765) (-0.791) (-1.200) (-0.043) (-0.173)
AAF -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004***  
 (-18.837) (-16.937) (-28.658)  
Year -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003***  
 (-9.686) (-6.422) (-11.552)  
Intercept 0.207*** 0.201*** 0.202*** -0.001 0.002
 (16.385) (46.990) (39.926) (-0.054) (0.350)
Adjusted R Square 0.257 0.208 0.256  
Degree of Freedom 1250 1309 2786  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable High Low Medium 
High- 
(Low+Medium) 
Low- 
(High+Medium)
Panel C: Full Regression 
E  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(-0.255) (-0.210) (-0.500) (-0.061) (-0.331)
AAF -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***  
(-10.891) (-11.521) (-17.363)  
Capitalization 0.000 0.000*** 0.000***  
(0.499) (-5.832) (-3.419)  
Volume 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000  
(-6.410) (4.986) (-0.289)  
Book-to-Market 0.003 0.021*** 0.021***  
(1.188) (5.659) (7.434)  
Block 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
(6.606) (6.704) (8.836)  
Year -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004***  
(-8.449) (-8.483) (-13.965)  
Intercept 0.182*** 0.175*** 0.178*** -0.001 0.002
(14.399) (33.304) (33.071) (-0.040) (0.381)
Adjusted R Square 0.307 0.283 0.300  
Degree of Freedom 1246 1305 2782  
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Table 5.2.2.3 
Event Study Analysis with E Index  
This table provides regression results for event study analysis with E Index on Regulation FD. 1995 to 1999 are recognized as before Regulation FD. 2001 to 2005 are 
recognized as after. Year 2000 is excluded from analysis. The dependent variable is PIN. Column (3), (6) and (9) are statistics of the differences on coefficients during the 
regulation tested with a event dummy variable. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *** and ** indicates significance at 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Basic Regression  Baseline Regression Full Regression 
 After Before After-Before  After Before After-Before After Before After-Before 
E  -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.003*** 0.000 -0.001
 (-1.143) (-1.390) (0.301) (-4.790) (-2.789) (-0.957) (-3.546) (-0.047) (-0.997)
AAF  -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
 (-28.930) (-23.481) (-20.218) (-15.804)
Capitalization   0.000*** 0.000***
   (-7.411) (-2.680)
Volume   0.000*** 0.000***
   (3.792) (3.227)
Book-to-Market   0.014*** 0.027***
   (5.017) (8.944)
Block   0.000*** 0.001***
   (8.625) (9.291)
Year -0.002*** -0.010*** -0.001** -0.010*** -0.001** -0.012***
 (-3.257) (-13.049) (-2.076) (-15.153) (-2.181) (-17.871)
Intercept 0.157*** 0.185*** 0.014*** 0.194*** 0.219*** 0.015*** 0.168*** 0.193*** 0.013***
 (21.952) (57.761) (3.095) (30.297) (68.544) (3.761) (24.681) (52.280) (3.249)
Adjusted R Square 0.005 0.078 0.238 0.273 0.286 0.336
Degree of Freedom 2740 2048 2739 2047 2735 2043
 
80
81 
Table 5.2.3.1 
Summary Statistics of G for Firms Staying in IRRC 
This table provides summary statistics of G, the Governance Index, from 1995 to 2005 for firms stay-
ing in the IRRC database for the full period. It consists of 741 firms with 3,705 annual G observations. 
Firms are allocated into 3 groups following Gompers et al. (2003). The Low group is composed of 
firms with G ≤ 5, and the High group is composed of firms with G ≥ 14. The rest are in the Medium 
group. A detailed description can be found in Section 5.2.3. 
 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 All 
Governance Index 
Minimum 2.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 
Maximum 17.0 18.0 19.0 18.0 18.0 19.0 
Mean 9.3 9.6 9.8 10.1 10.1 9.8 
Median 9.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Mode 9.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 11.0 10.0 
Std Dev 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.7 
Number of Firms 
G ≤ 5 (Low) 77 59 46 33 31 246 
G = 6 57 52 39 33 27 208 
G = 7 79 65 71 53 62 330 
G = 8 88 88 76 85 86 423 
G = 9 92 87 92 83 88 442 
G = 10 80 109 108 116 107 520 
G = 11 83 93 105 115 114 510 
G = 12 79 68 78 86 94 405 
G = 13 54 69 71 71 68 333 
G ≥ 14 (High) 52 51 55 66 64 288 
Total 741 741 741 741 741 3,705 
Percentage of Low 10.391% 7.962% 6.208% 4.453% 4.184% 6.640%
Percentage of High 7.018% 6.883% 7.422% 8.907% 8.637% 7.773%
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Table 5.2.3.2 
Regression Analysis on PIN for Firms Staying in IRRC 
This table provides regression results of 3,489 observations between 1995 and 2005 for firms staying 
in the IRRC database all along the period. The dependent variable is PIN. In Basic Regression only G 
and year are included. In Baseline Regression AFF is also considered. In Full Regression all other 
control variables are considered as well. Variable definitions are in Section 5.2.3 and Table 3.6. 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 0.01 level. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Basic Regression Baseline Regression Full Regression 
G -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001***
(-3.339) (-6.531) (-4.350)
AAF -0.003*** -0.003***
(-35.729) (-23.641)
Capitalization 0.000***
(-3.876)
Volume 0.000
(0.946)
Book-to-Market 0.018***
(8.269)
Block 0.000***
(9.972)
Year -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005***
(-16.295) (-17.961) (-20.293)
Intercept 0.168*** 0.210*** 0.186***
(49.285) (66.753) (51.778)
Adjusted R Square 0.078 0.325 0.364
Degree of Freedom 3486 3485 3481
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Table 5.2.3.3 
Group Analysis on PIN for Firms Staying in IRRC 
This table provides regression results for the High, Low, and Medium groups respectively. The sample 
period is between 1995 and 2005. The dependent variable is PIN. Variable definitions are in Section 
5.2.3 and Table 3.6. Column (4) provides statistics of the difference between coefficients of the High 
group and the other two groups, and Column (5) provides statistics of the difference between the Low 
group and the other two groups. The differences are tested with two group dummy variables. Panels A, 
B and C provide the regression results for the Basic, Baseline, and Full regressions correspondingly. 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses, with ***, ** and * indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
High Low Medium 
High- 
(Low+Medium) 
Low- 
(High+Medium)
Panel A: Basic Regression 
G 0.013*** 0.000 -0.001* 0.014*** 0.000
 (4.864) (-0.058) (-1.877) (4.399) (0.011)
Year -0.004*** -0.003 -0.005***  
 (-5.354) (-1.463) (-15.598)  
Intercept -0.038 0.169*** 0.164*** -0.202*** 0.015
 (-0.934) (5.087) (37.689) (-4.315) (0.685)
Adjusted R Square 0.160 0.012 0.078  
Degree of Freedom 284 172 3024  
Panel B: Baseline Regression 
G 0.009*** 0.004 -0.002*** 0.010*** 0.005
 (3.488) (0.573) (-5.526) (3.735) (1.383)
AAF -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003***  
 (-8.492) (-5.997) (-34.592)  
Year -0.004*** -0.002 -0.004***  
 (-6.049) (-1.274) (-17.427)  
Intercept 0.061 0.183*** 0.211*** -0.143*** 0.018
 (1.605) (6.053) (53.656) (-3.550) (-0.924)
Adjusted R Square 0.331 0.184 0.339  
Degree of Freedom 283 171 3023  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
High Low Medium 
High- 
(Low+Medium) 
Low- 
(High+Medium)
Panel C: Full Regression 
G 0.007*** -0.001 -0.001*** 0.010*** 0.003
 (2.888) (-0.222) (-3.399) (3.572) (0.727)
AAF -0.003*** -0.001 -0.003***  
 (-5.946) (-1.331) (-23.213)  
Capitalization 0.000* 0.000** 0.000***  
 (-1.700) (-2.196) (-3.551)  
Volume 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.455) (1.584) (0.401)  
Book-to-Market -0.004 0.080*** 0.018***  
 (-0.618) (4.597) (8.262)  
Block 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000***  
 (5.532) (4.481) (7.114)  
Year -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***  
 (-6.369) (-2.770) (-19.443)  
Intercept 0.071* 0.135*** 0.188*** -0.138*** -0.003
 (1.943) (4.693) (41.955) (-3.507) (-0.170)
Adjusted R Square 0.417 0.339 0.372  
Degree of Freedom 279 167 3019  
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Table 5.2.3.4 
Event Study Analysis for Firms Staying in IRRC 
This table provides regression results for event study analysis on Regulation FD by groups. The dependent variable is PIN. Panels A and B provide regression results for 
the High and Low groups respectively. Columns (3), (6) and (9) have statistics on the differences in coefficients before and after the regulation tested with a dummy 
variable. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *** and ** indicates significance at 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Basic Regression Baseline Regression Full Regression 
 After Before After-Before After Before After-Before After Before After-Before
G -0.001** -0.001 0.000 -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.001
 (-2.281) (-1.395) (-0.405) (-5.344) (-2.668) (-1.458) (-4.124) (-1.095) (-1.411)
AAF  -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002***
 (-26.785) (-21.411) (-18.134) (-12.201)
Capitalization   0.000*** 0.000
   (-4.411) (0.253)
Volume   0.000** 0.000**
   (2.535) (-2.318)
Book-to-Market   0.018*** 0.024***
   (5.315) (7.130)
Block   0.000*** 0.001***
   (6.116) (7.844)
Year -0.004*** -0.012*** -0.003*** -0.011*** -0.003*** -0.013***
 (-5.035) (-11.793) (-4.682) (-12.400) (-4.971) (-14.160)
Intercept 0.166*** 0.191*** 0.017** 0.208*** 0.223*** 0.018*** 0.183*** 0.198*** 0.016***
 (19.373) (34.834) (2.328) (28.140) (44.852) (2.860) (23.110) (36.453) (2.624)
Adjusted R Square 0.018 0.095 0.302 0.323 0.340 0.383
Degree of Freedom 1763 1362 1762 1361 1758 1357
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Table 5.2.3.5 
Event Study Analysis on Group Differences for Firms Staying in IRRC 
This table provides regression results for event study analysis on Regulation FD by groups. The dependent variable is PIN. Panels A and B provide regression results for 
the High and Low groups respectively. Columns (3), (6) and (9) have statistics on the differences in coefficients before and after the regulation tested with a dummy 
variable. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Basic Regression Baseline Regression Full Regression 
 After Before After-Before After Before After-Before After Before After-Before
Panel A: High 
G 0.000 0.033*** -0.033*** -0.001 0.028*** -0.025*** -0.002 0.025*** -0.026***
 (-0.080) (8.151) (-5.995) (-0.458) (6.182) (-4.859) (-0.703) (6.390) (-5.233)
AAF  -0.004*** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.001
  (-7.377) (-2.437) (-4.841) (-1.348)
Capitalization   0.000** 0.000
   (-2.456) (0.038)
Volume   0.000 0.000
   (0.855) (0.039)
Book-to-Market   0.005 0.011
   (0.529) (0.952)
Block   0.000** 0.001***
   (2.336) (6.073)
Year -0.004* -0.010*** -0.004** -0.011*** -0.003 -0.010***
 (-1.879) (-3.092) (-1.974) (-3.197) (-1.609) (-3.398)
Intercept 0.159*** -0.303*** 0.493*** 0.208*** -0.209*** 0.375*** 0.198*** -0.217*** 0.377***
 (2.793) (-5.000) (6.057) (4.182) (-2.976) (4.921) (4.010) (-3.493) (5.221)
Adjusted R Square 0.022 0.446 0.271 0.479 0.344 0.641
Degree of Freedom 160 94 159 93 155 89
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Basic Regression Baseline Regression Full Regression 
 After Before After-Before After Before After-Before After Before After-Before
Panel B: Low 
G 0.024* -0.015* 0.039*** 0.028** -0.012* 0.042*** 0.015 -0.013** 0.028**
 (1.826) (-1.915) (2.763) (2.197) (-1.766) (3.292) (0.986) (-2.138) (2.305)
AAF -0.003** -0.004*** 0.000 -0.002**
 (-2.201) (-7.106) (-0.001) (-2.352)
Capitalization 0.000 0.000
 (-1.573) (0.992)
Volume 0.000 0.000
(0.681) (-1.345)
Book-to-Market 0.071* 0.073***
 (1.760) (4.167)
Block 0.001 0.001***
 (1.441) (3.323)
Year -0.002 -0.008 -0.001 -0.006 -0.004 -0.008**
 (-0.270) (-1.576) (-0.146) (-1.473) (-0.515) (-2.149)
Intercept 0.053 0.253*** -0.163** 0.054 0.273*** -0.181*** 0.056 0.221*** -0.122**
 (0.638) (6.272) (-2.367) (0.672) (8.239) (-2.933) (0.689) (6.795) (-2.053)
Adjusted R Square 0.059 0.059 0.138 0.379 0.242 0.531
Degree of Freedom 54 99 53 98 49 94
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Table 5.2.4.1 
Summary Statistics of PIN and G on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX 
This table provides summary statistics of PIN and G on the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX market 
seperately. The sample consists of 21,167 observations from 1993 to 2006. A detailed description can 
be found in Section 5.2.4. 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation Observations
PIN     
AMEX 0.193 0.181 0.078 751
NYSE 0.143 0.133 0.055 12654
Nasdaq 0.175 0.164 0.07 7762
G   
AMEX 8.178 8 2.932 751
NYSE 9.571 10 2.676 12654
Nasdaq 8.346 8 2.604 7762
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Table 5.2.4.2 
Regression Analysis on PIN for Firms Listed on NYSE 
This table provides regression results of 4,136 observations between 1995 and 2005 for firms listed on 
NYSE. The dependent variable is PIN. In the Basic Regression, only G and year are included. In the 
Baseline Regression, AFF is also considered. In the Full Regression, all other control variables are 
considered as well. Variable definitions are in Section 5.2.4 and Table 3.6. T-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. *** indicates significance at 0.01 level. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Basic Regression Baseline Regression Full Regression 
G -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001***
 (-5.924) (-8.235) (-4.256)
AAF -0.004*** -0.003***
 (-46.262) (-29.418)
Capitalization 0.000***
 (-3.679)
Volume 0.000***
 (-4.627)
Book-to-Market 0.016***
 (11.649)
Block 0.000***
 (14.69)
Year -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
 (-27.53) (-34.765) (-37.481)
Intercept 0.182*** 0.221*** 0.191***
 (66.557) (93.248) (70.253)
Adjusted R Square 0.169 0.456 0.513
Degree of Freedom 4069 4068 4064
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Table 5.2.4.3 
Group Analysis on PIN for Firms Listed on NYSE 
This table provides regression results for the High, Low, and Medium groups respectively. The sample 
period is between 1995 and 2005. The dependent variable is PIN. Variable definitions are in Section 
5.2.3 and Table 3.6. Column (4) provides statistics on the difference between coefficients of the High 
group and the other two groups, and Column (5) provides statistics on the difference between the Low 
group and the other two groups. The differences are tested with two group dummy variables. Panels A, 
B, and C provide the regression results for the Basic, Baseline, and Full regressions correspondingly. 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses, with ***, ** and * indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
level respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
High Low Medium 
High- 
(Low+Medium) 
Low- 
(High+Medium)
Panel A: Basic Regression 
G 0.015*** -0.007 -0.001*** 0.016*** -0.005
 (6.150) (-1.359) (-4.187) (5.882) (-1.449)
Year -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.006***  
 (-8.138) (-5.361) (-25.978)  
Intercept -0.054 0.220*** 0.180*** -0.232*** 0.035**
 (-1.502) (8.970) (50.328) (-5.736) (2.010)
Adjusted R Square 0.264 0.107 0.166  
Degree of Freedom 291 252 3520  
Panel B: Baseline Regression 
G 0.010*** -0.006 -0.002*** 0.012*** -0.005
 (5.058) (-1.471) (-7.060) (5.427) (-1.496)
AAF -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003***  
 (-11.230) (-9.456) (-44.205)  
Year -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***  
 (-10.537) (-5.854) (-33.287)  
Intercept 0.048 0.251*** 0.222*** -0.170*** 0.025*
 (1.549) (11.731) (73.443) (-5.200) (1.774)
Adjusted R Square 0.487 0.342 0.464  
Degree of Freedom 290 251 3519  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
High Low Medium 
High- 
(Low+Medium) 
Low- 
(High+Medium)
Panel C: Full Regression 
G 0.008*** -0.009** -0.001*** 0.011*** -0.007**
 (4.053) (-2.254) (-3.943) (5.195) (-2.338)
AAF -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003***  
 (-7.888) (-4.369) (-28.279)  
Capitalization 0.000** 0.000 0.000***  
 (-2.190) (0.508) (-4.300)  
Volume 0.000 0.000* 0.000***  
 (0.327) (-1.798) (-4.350)  
Book-to-Market -0.017* 0.023*** 0.016***  
 (-1.958) (2.999) (11.919)  
Block 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000***  
 (4.795) (5.327) (11.365)  
Year -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.006***  
 (-9.667) (-6.581) (-35.819)  
Intercept 0.071** 0.220*** 0.194*** -0.159*** 0.034**
 (2.332) (10.236) (57.629) (-5.110) (2.538)
Adjusted R Square 0.546 0.448 0.518  
Degree of Freedom 286 247 3515  
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Table 5.2.4.4 
Event Study Analysis for Firms Listed on NYSE 
This table provides regression results for the event study analysis on Regulation FD by groups. The dependent variable is PIN. Panels A and B provide regression results 
for the High and Low groups respectively. Columns (3), (6) and (9) have statistics on the differences in coefficients before and after the regulation tested with a dummy 
variable. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *** and ** indicates significance at 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 Basic Regression  Baseline Regression  Full Regression 
 After Before After-Before  After Before After-Before  After Before After-Before
G -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001** 0.000
 (-3.723) (-4.192) (0.627) (-6.831) (-4.754) (-0.399) (-3.675) (-2.387) (-0.389)
AAF  -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002***
 (-39.282) (-23.915) (-25.522) (-12.785)
Capitalization   0.000** 0.000
   (-2.519) (-1.37)
Volume   0.000*** 0.000***
   (-3.361) (-2.981)
Book-to-Market   0.021*** 0.024***
   (10.797) (8.304)
Block   0.000*** 0.000***
   (12.097) (8.103)
Year -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.012***
 (-13.317) (-14.52) (-16.639) (-16.967) (-17.983) (-18.693)
Intercept 0.205*** 0.197*** 0.022*** 0.245*** 0.228*** 0.025*** 0.209*** 0.198*** 0.024***
 (31.467) (43.712) (3.875) (48.758) (55.82) (5.296) (40.191) (42.067) (5.486)
Adjusted R Square 0.089 0.122 0.482 0.351 0.556 0.416
Degree of Freedom 2032 1620 2031 1619 2027 1615
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Table 5.2.4.5 
Event Study Analysis on Group Differences for Firms Listed on NYSE 
This table provides regression results for the event study analysis on Regulation FD by groups. The dependent variable is PIN. Panels A and B provide regression results 
for the High and Low groups respectively. Columns (3), (6) and (9) have statistics on the differences in coefficients before and after the regulation, tested with a dummy 
variable. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicates significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Basic Regression Baseline Regression Full Regression 
 After Before After-Before After Before After-Before After Before After-Before
Panel A: High 
G 0.003 0.033*** -0.030*** 0.002 0.027*** -0.020*** 0.001 0.021*** -0.021***
 (0.875) (8.622) (-6.239) (1.12) (6.621) (-4.801) (0.663) (5.519) (-5.292)
AAF  -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002***
  (-11.801) (-3.027) (-7.722) (-2.878)
Capitalization   0.000** 0.000
   (-2.353) (-0.822)
Volume   0.000 0.000
   (0.186) (0.556)
Book-to-Market   0.007 -0.055***
   (0.779) (-2.692)
Block   0.000** 0.001***
   (2.032) (4.996)
Year -0.007*** -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.009***
 (-4) (-4.611) (-5.559) (-4.827) (-5.259) (-3.722)
Intercept 0.145*** -0.299*** 0.461*** 0.186*** -0.198*** 0.319*** 0.185*** -0.126** 0.330***
 (3.127) (-5.34) (6.545) (5.442) (-3.117) (5.134) (5.347) (-2.096) (5.562)
Adjusted R Square 0.092 0.477 0.513 0.521 0.555 0.656
Degree of Freedom 162 100 161 99 157 95
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 Basic Regression Baseline Regression  Full Regression 
 After Before After-Before After Before After-Before  After Before After-Before
Panel B: Low 
G 0.002 -0.011 0.013 0.005 -0.013** 0.018* -0.001 -0.014** 0.015
 (0.266) (-1.527) (1.203) (0.58) (-2.181) (1.859) (-0.109) (-2.574) (1.628)
AAF  -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002** -0.002
  (-3.91) (-8.075) (-2.099) (-2.611)
Capitalization   0.000 0.000
   (0.399) (0.31)
Volume   0.000 0.000*
  (-0.801) (-1.943)
Book-to-Market   0.006 0.035***
   (0.304) (3.594)
Block   0.001** 0.001***
   (2.303) (3.892)
Year -0.006 -0.011*** -0.007 -0.01*** -0.008* -0.009***
 (-1.459) (-3.385) (-1.655) (-3.694) (-1.935) (-3.748)
Intercept 0.181*** 0.25*** -0.041 0.202*** 0.291*** -0.063 0.205*** 0.24*** -0.049
 (3.384) (7.448) (-0.788) (4.092) (10.269) (-1.384) (4.022) (8.319) (-1.160)
Adjusted R Square 0.027 0.088 0.186 0.374 0.299 0.488
Degree of Freedom 79 144 78 143 74 139
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Figure 3.1 
Tree Diagram of the Trading Process 
 
Easley et al. (1996, pg 1409). 
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Figure 3.2 
Plot of quarterly and annual PIN during 1993 and 2006 
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Figure 3.3  
Sample Construction Process of G 
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Figure 3.4 
Main Regression Variables Construction Process 
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Figure 4.1 
Disclosure Decision Process 
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Figure 4.2 
Information Impact Path 
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Figure 4.3 
Internal and External Forces on Disclosure Structure 
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Figure 5.1 
Analysis on Information Asymmetry by Different Governance Levels 
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Figure 5.2 
Frequency Histogram of PIN 
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Figure 5.3 
Frequency Histogram of LOGPIN 
 
 
 
 
